Historical Background of Taiwan and China Relations
- Early History and Japanese Rule: Taiwan’s connection to mainland China has shifted over centuries. The Qing Dynasty controlled Taiwan in the 17th–19th centuries, but in 1895 it ceded Taiwan to Japan after the First Sino-Japanese War. For 50 years (1895–1945) Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule . After World War II, Japan relinquished control and the Republic of China (ROC) government under Chiang Kai-shek took over Taiwan in 1945.
- Chinese Civil War and 1949 Split: In the late 1940s, the Chinese Civil War raged between the Nationalists (Kuomintang, ruling the ROC) and the Communists (led by Mao Zedong). The war culminated in 1949 with the Communist victory on the mainland. Mao established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, while Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC government retreated to Taiwan . From Taipei, the ROC continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all China, even as the PRC asserted that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. Essentially, two rival regimes emerged in 1949 – the PRC controlling mainland China and the ROC governing Taiwan.
- Cold War Era and Competing Claims: Through the 1950s–1970s, both the PRC and ROC maintained that they were the sole legitimate government of “One China.” Initially, many Western and UN member states recognized the Taipei-based ROC as “China.” However, diplomatic tides shifted as the PRC gained international acceptance. In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 that transferred China’s UN seat from the ROC to the PRC, effectively ousting Taiwan’s representation. By 1979, the United States and most other countries had switched formal diplomatic recognition from Taipei (ROC) to Beijing (PRC) . From that point, Taiwan was largely excluded from the UN and related bodies, entrenching its unique de facto but widely unrecognized status.
Taiwan’s Current Political Status (Government, Constitution, Self-Governance)
Taiwan today is a self-governing democracy of about 23.5 million people . It operates under the official name Republic of China (ROC), with its capital in Taipei. Taiwan has a fully functional government with executive, legislative, and judicial branches separate from the PRC:
- Government and Elections: Taiwan’s government is headed by an elected President (head of state) and has a multi-party democratic system. The president and a unicameral legislature (Legislative Yuan) are chosen through free and fair elections. Since democratization in the late 1980s, Taiwan has seen peaceful transfers of power between parties. (For example, the current president as of 2025, Lai Ching-te, was elected in January 2024, succeeding President Tsai Ing-wen .) This robust democracy stands in contrast to mainland China’s one-party authoritarian system.
- Constitution and Legal Status: Taiwan’s constitutional framework is rooted in the ROC Constitution of 1947. This constitution was originally written when the ROC governed mainland China, and it technically still claims a broad definition of “China.” In practice, however, constitutional amendments and legal reforms have localized its application to Taiwan and a few outlying islands. Taiwan has its own laws and regulations; its constitution provides for democratic rights and governance in the territories under Taipei’s control. (Notably, pro-independence voices have at times advocated drafting a new Taiwan-specific constitution, but such moves are constrained by the risk of provoking Beijing.)
- Self-Governance and Institutions: Taiwan functions as an independent entity in all but name. It maintains its own armed forces (the ROC military), currency (New Taiwan Dollar), and immigration/customs controls. The PRC has never governed Taiwan or controlled its territory since 1949 . Instead, Taiwan’s authorities manage all internal affairs. The island issues its own passports, conducts its own foreign trade policy, and generally operates like a sovereign state domestically. However, due to political pressure from China, Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign state by most of the world (it lacks UN membership and is officially acknowledged by only a small number of countries, as discussed later). Despite this, Taiwan participates in some international organizations as an observer or under informal names. For example, it is a member of the World Trade Organization and APEC (as “Chinese Taipei”), even though it is excluded from the United Nations and its agencies .
In summary, Taiwan’s political status is de facto independent and democratic, but de jure it remains ambiguous. Taiwan self-governs with its own constitution and elected authorities, yet its statehood is not widely formalized due to the dispute with Beijing. The island’s populace enjoys civil liberties, a vibrant press, and regular elections – a stark contrast to mainland China’s political system.
Beijing’s Perspective: China’s Claims and Policies on Taiwan
The People’s Republic of China views Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory and has consistently sought to bring the island under Beijing’s rule. Key elements of China’s stance include:
- The One China Principle: Beijing’s core policy is that there is “One China” and Taiwan is part of it. The PRC insists it is the sole legal government representing China, and that the ROC on Taiwan ceased to be legitimate after 1949 . In practice, this means China considers any notion of “Taiwan independence” as illegitimate. Through the One China principle, Beijing asserts sovereignty over Taiwan and condemns other countries treating Taiwan as a separate nation. The Chinese government often refers to Taiwan as a “renegade province”, awaiting “reunification” with the mainland .
- Historical Claim and Civil War Narrative: From China’s perspective, the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 left an unfinished issue: the Communist victory was incomplete because the defeated Nationalists fled to Taiwan. Beijing’s official narrative is that Taiwan has been Chinese territory since ancient times (citing past imperial control) and that the PRC inherited sovereignty over Taiwan from the ROC but has not yet exercised it due to the “Chinese civil war’s legacy” . Notably, Beijing emphasizes that the Chinese Communist Party has never ruled Taiwan by force of arms only because of the wartime circumstances, not due to any legal separation.
- Pledge of “Reunification,” Not Ruling Out Force: China’s leaders maintain that they seek peaceful unification with Taiwan, but pointedly have not renounced the use of force to achieve this. President Xi Jinping and other officials regularly state that while peaceful methods are preferred, China reserves “all necessary means” – including military action – to prevent Taiwanese independence or foreign interference . A PRC law (the 2005 Anti-Secession Law) explicitly authorizes the use of force if Taiwan “secedes” or seems poised to do so. Beijing’s military posture (like fielding missiles across the strait) reinforces this implicit threat.
- “One Country, Two Systems” Proposal: The PRC has offered Taiwan a formula similar to Hong Kong’s governance, known as “one country, two systems,” wherein Taiwan could supposedly retain a high degree of autonomy under PRC sovereignty. However, this proposal has virtually no support in Taiwan (over 80% of Taiwanese oppose it) – a point discussed in Taiwan’s perspective below. China nevertheless continues to present “one country, two systems” as its roadmap for unification, despite Hong Kong’s example having severely undermined the idea’s credibility in Taiwan .
- Diplomatic Isolation of Taiwan: A key aspect of Beijing’s strategy is to deny Taiwan any international recognition as a country. The PRC refuses to have diplomatic relations with any nation that recognizes the ROC (Taiwan) . It insists that countries, international organizations, and global companies adhere to the One China principle (e.g. listing Taiwan as a province of China in documents, not as a separate country). As China’s global influence grew, it successfully pressured many states to cut formal ties with Taipei. Beijing claims a right to represent Taiwan internationally, arguing the ROC no longer has legal standing. (For instance, since 1971 the PRC holds China’s UN seat and has used that position to block even Taiwan’s observer participation in UN agencies like the WHO.)
- Zero Tolerance for “Taiwan Independence” Activities: The Chinese government routinely castigates any pro-Taiwan independence rhetoric or actions as separatist provocations. It has sanctioned Taiwanese politicians who openly advocate independence, and it pressures other governments to shun official contacts with Taiwan’s elected leaders. Beijing views the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan with suspicion, given the DPP’s historically pro-independence platform. Chinese officials have labeled current President Lai Ching-te a “splittist” due to his past comments, and warned that moves toward “de jure” independence will “bring disaster” to Taiwan . In short, any suggestion that Taiwan is already an independent nation or should formally declare independence is a red line for Beijing.
In sum, China’s view is uncompromising: Taiwan is part of China’s sovereign realm. The PRC’s One China policy is a non-negotiable precondition for any country’s relations with Beijing. China’s long-term goal remains the political unification of Taiwan with the PRC. To that end, Beijing employs diplomatic pressure, economic incentives or punishments, and an increasing military presence to erode Taiwan’s international standing and warn against moves toward independence.
Taiwan’s Perspective: Identity, Public Opinion, and Leadership Views
Within Taiwan, the attitude toward its own status and relationship with China is complex but has shifted markedly toward a distinct Taiwanese identity over recent decades. Key aspects of how Taiwan sees itself include:
- Taiwanese Identity vs Chinese Identity: The vast majority of Taiwan’s people today identify primarily as Taiwanese, not as Chinese. According to a 2023 Pew Research Center survey, 67% of people in Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese only, while just 3% identify as Chinese; about 28% embrace a dual Taiwanese-Chinese identity . This is a dramatic change from a few generations ago and reflects the emergence of a distinct civic identity. Even among those with familial roots in mainland China, a strong sense of Taiwanese identity now prevails. This public sentiment underpins resistance to unification with the PRC. It’s often said in Taiwan that “Taiwan is already a country – just not a widely recognized one.”
- De facto Independence and Status Quo: A majority of Taiwanese prefer to maintain the current de facto independence (the “status quo”) rather than make any drastic move toward either formal independence or unification. Polls consistently show 80% or more of the population favor some version of continuing the status quo indefinitely or deciding Taiwan’s fate later . For example, an April 2025 government survey found over 85% support maintaining the cross-strait status quo, with only tiny minorities favoring immediate unification or independence . The prevailing view is that Taiwan already functions as an independent country, so a formal declaration of independence is unnecessary and possibly dangerous. Conversely, there is very little appetite for uniting with China, especially under Beijing’s terms. Unification is generally unpopular given China’s authoritarian system and threats of force – recent polls show only single-digit support for eventually joining the PRC. The preservation of Taiwan’s current self-governance, free from PRC control, is a unifying preference across most of Taiwanese society.
- Rejection of “One Country, Two Systems”: Taiwan’s public overwhelmingly rejects Beijing’s “one country, two systems” model. Over 80–90% of Taiwanese consistently voice opposition to this framework . The Hong Kong experience (where promised autonomy under one country, two systems eroded rapidly) has deeply reinforced Taiwanese skepticism. Even politicians from Taiwan’s more China-friendly camp now distance themselves from that model. In a 2025 survey, 84% of respondents opposed one country, two systems and similarly about 82% disagreed with Beijing’s claim that “Taiwan is part of China” . There is a broad consensus in Taiwan that any future relationship with China must respect the island’s freedom and democracy – something one country, two systems is widely seen as failing to guarantee.
- Views of Political Leadership: Taiwan’s politics are divided primarily between two major parties, which articulate different nuances on identity and China policy:
- Democratic Progressive Party (DPP): The DPP (the current ruling party) leans toward a Taiwan-centric view. Its fundamental stance is that Taiwan is a sovereign, independent country already – under the name Republic of China (Taiwan) – so there is no need to declare independence formally . DPP leaders emphasize safeguarding Taiwan’s democracy and autonomy. For instance, former President Tsai Ing-wen and her successor Lai Ching-te have both refused to affirm the idea that Taiwan is part of the PRC. However, they stop short of any drastic moves that might provoke war; instead, they call for maintaining the status quo of self-rule. Tsai often reiterated that Taiwan’s future must be decided by its 23 million people and warned Beijing that pressure will not succeed. Lai Ching-te, in his 2024 inauguration, similarly upheld Taiwan’s democratic governance and called for dialogue with China “without preconditions,” even as he stated the PRC has no right to represent or rule Taiwan . The DPP strongly opposes the 1992 Consensus (explained below) and “one country, two systems.” It promotes a Taiwanese national identity distinct from China .
- Kuomintang (KMT): The opposition KMT, by contrast, has a more China-friendly approach. The KMT accepts a formulation called the “1992 Consensus,” which it interprets as “one China, different interpretations” – meaning both sides belong to one abstract China but can disagree on which government is legitimate . Under this ambiguity, the KMT maintains the ROC is the one China, while avoiding declaring Taiwan a separate nation. The KMT officially opposes Taiwan’s independence and favors closer economic and cultural ties with mainland China. KMT leaders advocate engagement and reducing tensions, believing it preserves peace and Taiwan’s prosperity. However, it’s notable that even the KMT has ruled out one country, two systems after seeing Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong . And in recent years, public opinion has made overtly pro-unification positions a political liability, so the KMT too focuses on status quo albeit with more cross-strait dialogue. The KMT’s stance could be summarized as seeking a peaceful eventual unification (or at least long-term coexistence) under a Chinese framework, but only if the system is acceptable to Taiwan – which, under current PRC conditions, it is not.
- Consensus and Differences: Despite their political rivalry, both major parties and the vast majority of Taiwanese agree on preserving Taiwan’s democratic way of life and freedom from PRC authoritarian rule. No significant political force in Taiwan today is actively pushing for immediate unification with China. The main debate is over how best to secure Taiwan’s de facto independence – through cautious management (DPP’s approach) or through engagement and avoiding provocation (KMT’s approach). There is also an emerging third force (smaller parties) that emphasize maintaining the status quo indefinitely.
In summary, Taiwan’s self-perception has evolved toward a strong separate identity. The public and leaders broadly see Taiwan as already sovereign in practice. While formalizing that status (e.g. renaming the country “Taiwan”) is avoided to prevent conflict, there is little desire to come under Beijing’s rule. Taiwan views itself as a free and democratic society that must be respected as such on the world stage, even if under the ambiguous ROC banner. This perspective fuels its resilience against China’s unification pressures.
International Recognition and Diplomacy: The “One China” Dilemma
Taiwan’s unique status is also evident in its diplomatic relations. Due to the One China policy enforced by Beijing, most countries do not officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, even if they maintain informal ties. Key points include:
- Formal Diplomatic Allies: As of mid-2025, only a small handful of countries (about a dozen) maintain official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). These are mostly small states in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, plus the Holy See (Vatican City) in Europe . This number has dwindled in recent years – Taiwan had over 20 allies in 2016, but aggressive courting by Beijing led nations like Panama (2017), El Salvador (2018), Nicaragua (2021), and Honduras (2023) to switch recognition to the PRC . Currently, only 11 UN member states (e.g. Paraguay, Guatemala, Haiti, Eswatini, etc.) and the Vatican recognize Taipei over Beijing . China’s leadership celebrates each diplomatic defection as progress toward isolating “Taiwan independence.” The remaining partners often face intense Chinese pressure or enticements (investment, aid) to break ties with Taiwan .
- One China Policy vs. Reality: All other countries – including all major powers (the U.S., Japan, EU nations, India, etc.) – officially recognize the PRC in Beijing as the sole legal government of “China.” This is the essence of the One China policy that countries adhere to for relations with Beijing. However, many of these countries simultaneously maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan, walking a fine line to balance Beijing’s demands with practical interests in Taiwan. For instance, over 50 countries host Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (de facto embassies) to handle trade, consular, and cultural ties with Taiwan, even though they don’t formally call them embassies. Likewise, Taiwan’s capital Taipei hosts many countries’ unofficial representative offices. This diplomatic dance allows interaction with Taiwan without formal recognition.
- The U.S. Example – Robust Unofficial Ties: The United States shifted formal recognition to Beijing in 1979, but at the same time it enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to sustain a strong unofficial relationship . Under the TRA, the U.S. treats Taiwan nearly as a nation-state equivalent for practical purposes: it sells Taiwan defensive arms, supports its membership in international organizations where possible, and promises to regard any coercive change to Taiwan’s status as “a threat to peace” of grave concern. The U.S. operates a private entity, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), as its de facto embassy in Taipei. Washington’s policy, often termed “strategic ambiguity,” acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China without endorsing it, and insists the Taiwan issue be settled peacefully . The U.S. does not recognize the ROC as a sovereign country, but it also does not accept Beijing’s right to take Taiwan by force. This nuanced stance – recognizing the PRC, maintaining unofficial ties with Taiwan, and opposing unilateral changes – is mirrored by many other democracies. (Japan, Canada, the EU and others have similar approaches, often coordinating quietly on Taiwan matters.)
- International Organizations: Taiwan’s diplomatic limbo means it is largely excluded from organizations requiring statehood. Notably, Taiwan has no seat at the United Nations or its sub-agencies (the PRC blocks any Taiwanese participation, even as an observer, at the World Health Assembly, ICAO, etc.). Despite this, Taiwan has found ways to engage in international cooperation. It is a full member of APEC and the WTO (because these bodies accept “economies” rather than sovereign states) . In events like the Olympics, Taiwan competes under the name “Chinese Taipei.” There is widespread international sympathy for Taiwan’s desire for greater participation, but Beijing’s objections often prevail. A growing number of countries have voiced support for Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in bodies like the WHO, especially after Taiwan’s effective response to COVID-19, but formal changes remain blocked by PRC diplomacy.
- Diplomatic Truce and Tensions: From 2008–2016 (under a KMT government in Taipei), there was a tacit “diplomatic truce” where Beijing stopped poaching Taiwan’s allies and Taiwan did not seek new formal recognitions. However, since 2016 (with the DPP in power), China resumed efforts to shrink Taiwan’s diplomatic footprint . Each time a country flips recognition to Beijing, Taiwan condemns what it calls “dollar diplomacy” and often cuts aid immediately. Meanwhile, Taiwan has strengthened ties with its remaining allies to shore them up . Taipei also deepens unofficial relationships with major powers. Notably, Japan and some European countries have significantly boosted exchanges with Taiwan, even at the cost of friction with Beijing. For example, Lithuania in 2021 agreed to let Taiwan open a “Taiwanese Representative Office” under that name, drawing Chinese economic retaliation but earning EU and U.S. support. This indicates some countries are increasingly willing to defy Beijing’s strictures in order to support Taiwan’s international presence.
- Global Balancing Act: Most nations carefully calibrate their language on Taiwan. For instance, EU countries and India do not formally recognize Taiwan but have expanding economic ties and occasionally send lawmakers or ex-officials to Taiwan. Globally, there is broad support for peace and the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, even among countries that align with Beijing officially. The vast majority of states do not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty in their official policy (they neither recognize Taiwan nor explicitly endorse Beijing’s claim over it). This strategic ambiguity in the international community helps prevent the Taiwan question from sparking wider conflict. At the same time, Taiwan’s democratic status and technological importance (see below) have led to growing international solidarity with it, often to China’s irritation.
In summary, Taiwan’s diplomatic situation is characterized by extremely limited formal recognition but quite extensive informal and practical ties. Only a dozen small countries formally acknowledge Taiwan as a country, due to China’s insistence on exclusivity. However, major world powers maintain vigorous unofficial relations with Taipei, supporting its security and economic prosperity without crossing Beijing’s red line of official recognition. This delicate balance is a cornerstone of the international status quo regarding Taiwan.
Major Current Events and Tensions (up to July 2025)
The Taiwan–China relationship is highly dynamic and has seen escalating tensions in recent years, with significant regional and global implications. Major current issues include military developments, great-power involvement (especially the United States), and trade/technology competition:
- Military Buildup and Show of Force: China’s military (PLA) has rapidly expanded and modernized, with a focus on capabilities relevant to a Taiwan conflict. Beijing has intensified military pressure on Taiwan to intimidate the island and signal its resolve. For instance, Chinese warplanes and ships now routinely operate around Taiwan:
- In 2022, the PLA sent approximately 1,700 aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) – nearly double the incursions from the previous year . These included fighters and nuclear-capable bombers probing Taiwan’s air defenses. In 2023, similar high levels of incursions continued, establishing a “new normal” of almost daily military intrusions.
- Chinese forces have also eroded the earlier tacit boundary at the Taiwan Strait median line. Increasingly, PLA aircraft and naval vessels cross the median line that used to delineate areas of separate control. This was particularly evident during drills in 2022 and 2023 when dozens of fighter jets crossed the median in a single day .
- Beijing has conducted large-scale military exercises simulating an attack or blockade of Taiwan. A dramatic example occurred in August 2022 after a controversial U.S. visit to Taiwan (see below): the PLA launched its biggest war games in decades, encircling Taiwan with live-fire drills. It fired ballistic missiles into waters around Taiwan – some missiles even flying over the island – for the first time since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis . Five of those missiles landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, underscoring the regional scope of the crisis .
- In April 2023, after Taiwan’s President met the U.S. House Speaker, China responded with three days of drills around Taiwan. These exercises, labeled “Joint Sword,” practiced sealing off the island; dozens of Chinese fighters and ships “encircled” Taiwan in a show of force . Notably, at least 42 Chinese aircraft crossed the median line during those drills .
- Chinese military pressure is also taking gray-zone forms, like drone flights near Taiwanese-held islands and cyber attacks on Taiwanese infrastructure, aiming to wear down Taiwan’s readiness.
- Taiwan’s Response: Taiwan has been scrambling jets, strengthening air defense, and closely tracking PLA movements. Recognizing the growing threat, Taiwan’s government has increased defense spending and undertaken reforms. In December 2022, President Tsai announced the extension of compulsory military service from 4 months to 1 full year, effective 2024 , reversing an earlier reduction. Taiwan is also pursuing asymmetric warfare strategies (mines, missiles, drones) to deter a larger Chinese force. Regular civil defense drills and annual military exercises (like the Han Kuang exercises) prepare for various invasion scenarios. While Taiwan’s military is much smaller than the PLA, its mountainous terrain and advanced weaponry (acquired from the U.S. and others) form a deterrent. However, officials often acknowledge the need to do more; the war in Ukraine (2022) spurred debates in Taiwan about improving reserves and ammunition stockpiles in case of a blockade.
- U.S.–China–Taiwan Triangle: The United States plays a critical role in the current tensions. U.S. support for Taiwan has become more visible, and China’s opposition to it has grown more vocal:
- The Trump and Biden administrations both took significant steps to bolster ties with Taiwan. Under President Trump, high-level U.S. officials visited Taiwan and numerous arms sales were approved (over $18 billion in 2017–2020) . Under President Biden, this trend continued: military aid and cooperation expanded, and U.S. Navy ships regularly transit the Taiwan Strait as a freedom-of-navigation signal . In 2022, the U.S. Congress passed laws authorizing loan and grant programs to finance Taiwanese arms purchases and even to draw from U.S. weapons stockpiles for Taiwan’s defense . This unprecedented support (only Ukraine has a similar arrangement) underscores bipartisan U.S. concern for Taiwan’s security.
- High-Level Visits: A major flashpoint was the August 2022 visit of U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taipei. She was the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit in 25 years and met with President Tsai. China reacted with fury: besides the aforementioned military drills, Beijing sanctioned Pelosi, cut off certain U.S.–China dialogues, and banned imports of some Taiwanese goods (such as citrus, fish, and sand exports) . The exercise effectively rehearsed a blockade, demonstrating China’s ability to close off Taiwan’s ports and air routes . This episode significantly ratcheted up tensions.
- In April 2023, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen met U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy on U.S. soil (California) during a transit. Even though this meeting was in Los Angeles and not Taipei, China responded with anger and launched another round of military drills around Taiwan, alongside diplomatic protests . Beijing views any official-level contacts between the U.S. (or other countries) and Taiwan’s leadership as an assault on the One China principle. Such visits have become a new norm – with European parliamentarians, former officials, and ministers from some countries also making trips to Taiwan – each time drawing Chinese condemnation and sometimes retaliatory steps.
- U.S. Policy Shifts: While the U.S. still upholds an official One China policy (not recognizing Taiwan), its actions have increasingly treated Taiwan as a close partner. Notably, President Joe Biden on four occasions stated that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if it were attacked – comments that departed from the traditional “strategic ambiguity.” Although White House staff walked back each statement, the impression remains that U.S. resolve toward Taiwan is hardening . China has warned that U.S. “meddling” is emboldening Taiwanese separatists, whereas U.S. officials argue that China’s growing coercion is forcing them to respond.
- China’s View: Beijing accuses Washington of “hollowing out” the One China policy and moving toward “containment” of China with Taiwan as a pawn. U.S.–China strategic rivalry has made Taiwan one of the most contentious issues between the two powers. After events like Pelosi’s visit, Chinese officials have outright warned that Taiwan could trigger a U.S.–China conflict if mismanaged. This global dimension of the Taiwan issue has made it a central topic in U.S.–China diplomatic engagements (e.g., at the 2022 and 2023 G20 meetings, Biden and Xi spent significant time on Taiwan). Each side urges the other to not change the status quo: the U.S. tells China no use of force; China tells the U.S. no overt support for “Taiwan independence.”
- Allied Support: Besides the U.S., other democracies have shown greater support for Taiwan amid China’s pressure. Japan has spoken of Taiwan’s security as vital to its own – a notable shift. In 2021, Japan’s defense white paper for the first time emphasized stability in the Taiwan Strait as important. Australia, some European countries, and G7 statements have all highlighted peace in the Taiwan Strait and opposed “unilateral changes to the status quo,” implicitly criticizing Beijing’s actions. This internationalization of the issue is welcomed by Taipei but denounced by Beijing.
- Economic and Trade Issues: Taiwan’s economy is deeply intertwined with both China and the global market, which creates another set of tensions:
- Cross-Strait Trade: Paradoxically, China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner. As of 2022, trade with mainland China (and Hong Kong) accounts for roughly 23% of Taiwan’s total trade . Taiwanese companies have extensive operations in China, and China is a key market for Taiwan’s exports (especially electronics and machinery). This interdependence gives Beijing some leverage. China has occasionally employed trade as a coercive tool. A striking example was in 2021, when China banned imports of Taiwanese pineapples (and later other fruits like wax apples and sugar apples) citing spurious pest concerns. Given that over 90% of Taiwan’s pineapple exports went to China, this was seen as a politically motivated sanction on Taiwanese farmers from pro-DPP regions . In 2022, after Pelosi’s visit, China similarly halted imports of certain Taiwanese food products and natural sand exports to Taiwan . These measures are designed to inflict economic pain and exploit divisions, though Taiwan often rallies domestic support (“eat freedom pineapples”) and finds alternative markets to mitigate the impact .
- Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield”: Taiwan is a critical player in the global semiconductor industry, which has major strategic implications. Taiwan (notably TSMC – Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.) produces over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and about 90% of the most advanced (sub-7nm) chips . This dominance means that most of the world’s cutting-edge devices – from smartphones to military systems – rely on chips made in Taiwan. This has been dubbed Taiwan’s “silicon shield,” theoretically dissuading China from attacking since the disruption would cripple global tech supply chains. However, it’s also a point of tension: China has a national priority to become self-sufficient in semiconductors, partly to reduce reliance on Taiwanese (and Western) technology. In the intensifying U.S.–China tech rivalry, Taiwan is caught in the middle. The U.S. has imposed export controls to deny China access to advanced chip technology, and Taiwan has largely complied – for example, TSMC stopped taking orders from Huawei (a Chinese telecom giant) after U.S. bans. In 2023, Taiwan further restricted exports of advanced chipmaking equipment to China, aligning with U.S. policy. Beijing protested such moves as Taiwan “joining the U.S. in containing China.” At the same time, China’s military planners are acutely aware that if they seized Taiwan intact, they would gain control of this semiconductor capacity – a factor some analysts worry could tempt a calculated move.
- Diversification Efforts: Both Taiwan and others are working to diversify economic links. Taiwan has been reducing its over-reliance on the mainland market (the share of exports to China has dipped slightly as companies pivot to Southeast Asia and India). It is also seeking trade pacts with other partners: for instance, Taiwan applied to join the CPTPP trade bloc and in 2023 signed the U.S.–Taiwan 21st Century Trade Initiative, a bilateral agreement to deepen trade ties . These efforts aim to strengthen Taiwan’s economy against potential Chinese sanctions or a blockade scenario. On the other side, China has tried to woo Taiwanese businesses with incentives to invest in the mainland, even as political relations worsen.
- Global Supply Chain Concerns: The COVID-19 pandemic and chip shortages highlighted the world’s dependence on Taiwanese semiconductors, sparking initiatives in the U.S. and Europe to onshore some chip production (e.g., TSMC is building major fabs in Arizona and Japan) . However, replicating Taiwan’s efficient chip ecosystem abroad has proved challenging . The “Chip War” between the U.S. and China places Taiwan in a delicate position – it must navigate between its biggest security partner (U.S.) and its biggest economic partner (China). So far, Taiwan has aligned more with the U.S. camp on tech standards, reinforcing Beijing’s perception that Taipei is tilting away from “one China” economic integration.
- Current Leadership and Cross-Strait Outlook: Since mid-2024, Taiwan is led by President Lai Ching-te (DPP), who succeeded Tsai Ing-wen. Lai has stated he will continue Tsai’s policy of maintaining the status quo, i.e., no declaration of independence but no acceptance of PRC governance. In his 2024 victory speech, Lai called for “peaceful dialogue” with Beijing to replace confrontation . However, Beijing remains distrustful of Lai (due to his past pro-independence comments) and has not resumed official communications with the Taiwan government. Cross-strait relations thus remain frosty, with military posturing in lieu of dialogue. Many observers are watching whether China will further escalate militarily or try softer tactics (like courting Taiwanese after Lai’s election) in the coming year. Notably, Taiwan will hold another presidential election in early 2028; Beijing sometimes times its pressures around Taiwan’s election cycles, either to intimidate voters or warn against certain candidates.
- International Reactions and Risk of Conflict: The heightened tensions have alarmed the international community. The scenario of a forced reunification attempt is often cited as a potential trigger for a great-power war. U.S. officials have openly stated that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be catastrophic and would likely involve the United States and allies – a conflict scenario with immense economic and security fallout. Analysts note that even a blockade or sustained crisis could upend global trade (the Taiwan Strait is a major shipping lane) and the semiconductor supply. As a result, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait has become a top priority voiced in multilateral forums (ASEAN, G7, etc.). Countries are urging restraint: “no unilateral change of status quo” is a common refrain directed at Beijing’s actions. Military planners in the region (Japan, U.S., Australia) are also coordinating more on potential Taiwan contingencies, increasing joint exercises and planning. This has the effect of further angering China, which views it as containment.
In conclusion, as of July 2025, Taiwan–China relations are at one of their most fraught points in decades. China’s growing power and impatience, Taiwan’s firm public resistance to unification, and greater international involvement (especially by the U.S.) form a combustible mix. While outright war is still seen as a worst-case scenario that all sides hope to avoid, the risk is no longer remote. Any miscalculation – a military accident or a political misstep – could spiral into conflict. Thus, the Taiwan Strait remains one of the world’s most closely watched flashpoints. At the same time, Taiwan’s vibrant democracy continues to seek its place in the international community, and many nations quietly support its free way of life. The coming years will be critical in determining whether the Taiwan–China standoff deepens or some form of peaceful equilibrium can be sustained in this complex and delicate relationship.
Sources:
- Council on Foreign Relations – Backgrounder on China-Taiwan Relations
- The Diplomat – Taiwan’s Remaining Diplomatic Partnerships (June 2025)
- Pew Research Center – Survey of Identity in Taiwan (Jan 2024)
- Focus Taiwan (CNA) – Mainland Affairs Council Poll Results (April 2025)
- The Guardian – various articles on Taiwan (2021–2024)
- Reuters – Coverage of Chinese Military Drills around Taiwan (Aug 2022)
- The Guardian/AFP – Report on PLA Air Incursions (Jan 2023)
- Trade.gov (U.S. Dept. of Commerce) – Taiwan Market Overview
- Council on Foreign Relations – CFR Backgrounder (cont.) on U.S. Policy
- Focus Taiwan (CNA) – Taiwan Extends Conscription (referenced)