Great prompt. Here’s a complete, debate‑ready brief you can use to argue both sides of “Politics is more powerful than economics,” with crisp cases, conditions, and cross‑examination angles.

One‑sentence take

Politics usually has the constitutive power—it writes the rules, creates/abolishes markets, and can override them in emergencies—while economics has the disciplining power—prices, finance, and real resources punish unsustainable political choices. Which dominates depends on institutions, openness to capital, and crisis conditions. (North; Rodrik; Polanyi.) 

A quick framework (what “power” means here)

• Constitutive political power: the state defines property rights, money, trade rules, taxation, sanctions, and legitimate coercion. (North; WTO.)  
• Instrumental political power: fiscal/monetary choices, industrial policy, export controls, sanctions, mobilization in war or pandemics. (BIS; CHIPS; EU oil‑price‑cap coalition.)  
• Economic disciplining power: bond markets, exchange rates, capital flows, inflation, supply constraints, and productivity trends that constrain or topple political programs. (BoE on the 2022 gilt crisis; Italy 2011; CBI research.)  

The affirmative: why 

politics > economics

1. Politics writes (and rewrites) the rules of the game. Institutions—laws, courts, central‑bank mandates—shape what markets can do. That’s the core of North’s institutional economics and Acemoglu & Robinson’s “inclusive vs. extractive” institutions.  
2. States can re‑wire global supply chains via industrial policy. The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act (≈$52.7B for chips plus R&D) and the Inflation Reduction Act (mass clean‑energy credits/loans) are explicit political choices creating new investment flows and cost curves.  
3. Export controls and sanctions trump comparative advantage. U.S. advanced‑computing/semiconductor controls (Oct 7, 2022; expanded Oct 17, 2023) deliberately restrict China’s access to leading‑edge chips; allies align licensing and scope.  
4. Climate politics is changing trade prices. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism began a transitional phase on Oct 1, 2023 (reporting now; payment via CBAM certificates from Jan 1, 2026/operationalization into 2027 per updates), shifting incentives for steel, cement, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen.  
5. War & coercion: the oil‑price cap shows political coordination setting de‑facto prices. The G7/EU/Australia cap on Russian seaborne crude at $60 (from Dec 5, 2022; products from Feb 5, 2023) conditions access to Western shipping/insurance services.  
6. Emergency politics overrides markets. During COVID‑19, governments imposed lockdowns (tracked by Oxford’s OxCGRT), triggering the sharpest global contraction since the 1930s.  
7. Authoritarian policy can swiftly reshape sectors. China’s abrupt suspension of Ant Group’s $37B IPO and record Alibaba antitrust fine re‑drew digital‑finance and platform economics virtually overnight.  
8. Resource cartels are political. OPEC+ decisions (e.g., surprise 1.16 mb/d voluntary cuts in April 2023) moved Brent up within days—political coordination moving a global price.  
9. Politics can impose big structural shifts with known costs. The UK’s Brexit decision is assessed by the OBR to lower long‑run productivity by ~4% vs. EU‑membership counterfactual (via less trade intensity).  
10. Classic theory backs it: Polanyi argued “laissez‑faire was planned”—markets are embedded in political/legal orders, not autonomous realms.  

The negative: why 

economics > politics

 (discipline and constraint)

1. Bond markets can punish—and reverse—policy. The UK’s 2022 “mini‑budget” sparked a gilt sell‑off and LDI margin spiral, forcing a BoE intervention and the policy’s rapid unravelling. Markets constrained politics.  
2. Currency markets can override sovereignty. Black Wednesday (1992): the UK left the ERM after spending ≈$22B trying to defend sterling; economics forced political retreat and a regime change toward inflation‑targeting.  
3. Eurozone sovereigns learned that financing conditions set red lines. In 2011, surging Italian yields (>6–7%) and IMF/EU “intrusive surveillance” boxed in policy and precipitated leadership change.  
4. IMF conditionality can flip domestic agendas. Greece (2010–12) and Sri Lanka (from 2023) accepted deep reforms, tax changes, and spending paths to regain external financing.  
5. If politics defies monetary arithmetic, inflation bites back. Turkey’s low‑rate experiment amid 80%+ inflation (2022) ended in a pivot to orthodoxy and steep hikes to 50% (2024–25).  
6. Sanctions face market evasion. The Russia oil price‑cap works imperfectly; a growing “shadow fleet,” alternative insurers, and enforcement gaps dilute its bite—an example of economic adaptation limiting political intent.  

When each side tends to dominate

• Politics dominates when: the state retains fiscal space and coercive capacity; capital controls are tight; institutions are cohesive; there’s a security emergency or strong, coordinated industrial policy. (BIS export controls; CHIPS/IRA; OPEC+ cuts; COVID stringency.)  
• Economics dominates when: the country is highly open to capital flows; public debt is high/rollover‑sensitive; monetary credibility is shaky; productivity and external balances are weak; or legal/institutional checks (e.g., independent central bank) are binding. (BoE 2022; Italy 2011; CBI literature.)  

Case mini‑dossiers you can cite

• UK 2022 gilt crisis (politics constrained by markets). LDI funds’ forced selling and evaporating liquidity led BoE to step in; the fiscal plan was reversed.  
• EU CBAM (politics re‑prices carbon at the border). Transitional phase since Oct 1, 2023; full financial obligations start with certificates from 2026 (annualized by 2027 per implementation).  
• US export controls on advanced chips (political chokepoints). Oct 2022 and Oct 2023 rules restrict China’s access to AI‑relevant hardware and tools.  
• China 2020–21 platform crackdown (state trumps market cap). Ant IPO pulled; Alibaba fined RMB 18.2B; sector “rectification” followed.  
• OPEC+ 2023 surprise cuts (geopolitics moves prices). ~1.16 mb/d voluntary cuts; oil jumped within a day.  
• Brexit (politics with persistent economic costs). OBR assumes a ~4% long‑run productivity hit tied to lower trade intensity.  
• Sri Lanka crisis & IMF program (economics forces political turnover and policy path). 2022 protests toppled a president; IMF EFF since Mar 2023, multiple reviews completed.  
• Turkey’s monetary U‑turn (inflation disciplines policy). From rate cuts with 80%+ inflation (2022) to sharp tightening (2023–25).  
• Russia oil cap (political coalition; adaptive markets). Cap effective dates Dec 5, 2022 (crude) and Feb 5, 2023 (products); enforcement/evasion tension persists.  
• COVID‑19 (politics halts commerce; economics bears the cost). Policy stringency tracked by OxCGRT; IMF recorded a –3% global GDP contraction in 2020.  

Cross‑examination questions (for either side)

• To the “economics dominates” side: Who grants central‑bank independence and lender‑of‑last‑resort powers? Why does changing a few legal words (e.g., CHIPS, IRA, CBAM) redirect billions?  
• To the “politics dominates” side: If politics rules, why did the UK’s mini‑budget collapse in markets within days, or the UK in 1992 exit the ERM despite political resolve?  
• To both: Under what conditions do sanctions work or fail? (Compare price‑cap intentions versus evasion.)  

How to argue it cleanly

Strong pro‑politics line:

“Markets don’t exist in a vacuum; they’re created, bounded, and sometimes suspended by state choice. From export controls and carbon border pricing to pandemic lockdowns and wartime rationing, politics routinely sets the feasible economic set.” (North; Polanyi; BIS; EU CBAM.) 

Strong pro‑economics line:

“Political promises encounter the hard budget constraint: if financing dries up, currencies slide, or inflation soars, policies reverse. Bond markets, exchange rates, and inflation expectations can change leaders faster than elections.” (BoE 2022; Italy 2011; CBI literature.) 

Decision criteria you can propose to judges/execs

1. Constitutional scope: Who sets the rules that others must obey? (If yes → politics.)  
2. Financing & rollover risk: Can the policy be funded at tolerable rates? (If no → economics.)  
3. Crisis status: War/pandemic/financial crisis? Politics tends to centralize power; economics bites later.  
4. Openness & capital mobility: More openness → stronger market discipline. (Italy 2011; Black Wednesday.)  

Suggested reading (reliable, concise)

• Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (institutions shape outcomes).  
• Dani Rodrik, Political Trilemma of the Global Economy (can’t simultaneously maximize deep integration, national sovereignty, and mass democracy).  
• Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (markets are embedded; “laissez‑faire was planned”).  
• Bank of England papers on the 2022 gilt‑market crisis (how market plumbing can whip policy).  
• OBR on Brexit impacts (transparent, model‑based assessment).  
• BIS/US Treasury/EU guidance on chip controls and the oil price cap (contemporary policy muscle).  

Bottom line

If you must choose, politics is “more powerful” in the sense that it constitutes and commands the economy, and in crises it can suspend or re‑route markets. But economics is “more powerful” in the sense that it enforces constraints—through financing conditions, inflation, and real resource limits that ultimately discipline politics. Your best move in debate (or strategy) is to argue contingency: specify the institutional setting, the degree of openness to capital, and whether you’re in normal times or crisis—and then show why in that context one side dominates.