China’s Investment in Cambodia: Drivers, Impacts, and the “Ironclad” Partnership

Introduction

China and Cambodia have cultivated a remarkably close partnership often described as “ironclad” or “steel” friendship . In recent years, China has poured extensive investments into Cambodia’s economy – from highways and high-rises to hydropower dams and special economic zones. What motivates this small Southeast Asian nation to attract outsized Chinese attention? This report explores the economic, political, and historical reasons behind China’s heavy investment in Cambodia, and analyzes how this influx of capital and influence is impacting Cambodia’s development. Both Chinese and Cambodian perspectives are considered, highlighting the opportunities for prosperity as well as the challenges of dependence. The tone is upbeat and engaging, reflecting the optimism that, with mindful navigation, this partnership can build a “community with a shared future” as both sides often proclaim .

Historical Context of China-Cambodia Relations

China-Cambodia relations date back over six decades. The two countries established formal diplomatic ties in 1958, shortly after Cambodia’s independence from France . Through the Cold War, the relationship waxed and waned – China initially supported Cambodia’s late King Norodom Sihanouk’s regime as a counterweight to Western and Vietnamese influence . In the 1970s, however, Beijing controversially backed the Khmer Rouge regime, straining ties once a Vietnamese-backed government (led by a young Hun Sen) took power in 1979 .

After decades of conflict, relations warmed significantly in the late 1990s. Following a 1997 coup, when Western aid was withdrawn in protest, Hun Sen famously “turned to China out of necessity.” Beijing eagerly stepped in with loans and investments to support the like-minded regime . Hun Sen declared in 2021, “If I don’t rely on China, who will I rely on?” – encapsulating how crucial Chinese support had become for Cambodia’s government. By the 2000s, the partnership was formalized and upgraded: a “comprehensive strategic partnership” since 2010, and a joint vision to build a “China-Cambodia community of shared future” signed in 2019 . Cambodian leaders consistently refer to China as the country’s “most trusted friend” and “steadfast partner”, reflecting a firm consensus within the ruling party to maintain close ties .

This historical bond set the stage for Cambodia to become one of China’s closest allies in Southeast Asia today. Decades of diplomatic goodwill, reinforced by generous Chinese aid with “no strings attached”, have created what both sides hail as an “all-weather friendship” built on mutual political trust . Against this backdrop of camaraderie, China’s current investments can be seen as both a continuation of long-standing ties and a new chapter under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013 .

Economic Motivations for China’s Investments in Cambodia

From an economic standpoint, Cambodia offers fertile ground for Chinese investment despite its relatively small market size. Below are key economic motivations driving China’s Cambodia push:

• Infrastructure and Connectivity: Cambodia’s need for modern infrastructure aligns perfectly with China’s BRI vision. Chinese companies have financed and built roads, bridges, ports, and airports across the country. Notably, the 187-km Phnom Penh–Sihanoukville Expressway – Cambodia’s first highway – was built under a $2 billion Chinese investment and opened in 2022 . It has slashed travel time between the capital and the main seaport from 5 hours to 2 hours, boosting transport efficiency and trade . By late 2024, the expressway had served over 10 million trips, hailed as a “major achievement under Belt and Road cooperation” . Similarly, China funded the new Siem Reap Angkor International Airport (opened in 2023) to increase tourism capacity near Cambodia’s famed Angkor Wat . Chinese assistance has also built more than 2,000 km of roads and seven major bridges in Cambodia over the past decade . These projects not only help Cambodia’s development but also benefit China by improving regional connectivity and showcasing BRI success stories.
• Real Estate and Special Economic Zones: Chinese investors have poured money into Cambodian real estate – constructing skyscrapers, hotels, and entire new districts. Nowhere is this more visible than Sihanoukville, a coastal city transformed by Chinese-led development. Once a quiet beach town, Sihanoukville’s skyline is now filled with high-rises (casinos, condos, malls) mostly Chinese-owned, and its economy pivoted to serve waves of Chinese businesses and tourists. A flagship project is the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SEZ), a China-Cambodia jointly developed industrial park hosting around 170 factories. The SEZ has attracted manufacturing and textile companies, creating thousands of local jobs and becoming a model BRI project in Southeast Asia . China’s investments in such zones are driven by the search for lower-cost production bases and to bypass tariffs – especially after the U.S.–China trade tensions. In fact, Chinese firms have relocated factories to Cambodia to leverage its preferential trade access to Western markets . This not only sustains Cambodia’s export growth (in garments, footwear, etc.) but also helps Chinese companies mitigate trade war impacts .
• Trade and Market Access: Strengthening trade ties is another motivation. China views Cambodia as a growing market for Chinese goods and a source of agricultural products. Since the China-Cambodia Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) and the regional RCEP trade pact took effect in 2022, bilateral trade has surged. In 2024, China-Cambodia trade volume reached nearly $14–15 billion, up 24% from the year prior . China is now by far Cambodia’s largest trading partner, surpassing even neighboring Vietnam and Thailand . Chinese consumers are buying more Cambodian rice, bananas, mangoes, and cassava under the new tariff-free arrangements . At the same time, Cambodia imports large quantities of machinery, electronics, vehicles, and textiles inputs from China. Beijing’s economic planners see this growing trade as a win-win: it supports Cambodia’s development while also expanding China’s export markets and integrating Cambodia into China-centric supply chains. By helping Cambodia industrialize and improve logistics, China is effectively nurturing a reliable trade partner next door.
• Energy and Natural Resources: Cambodia’s developing energy sector has attracted Chinese investment as well. Chinese firms have financed and built major hydropower dams (such as Lower Sesan II and Kamchay dams) and coal power plants, addressing Cambodia’s electricity shortages while securing business for Chinese energy companies. These projects align with China’s interest in exporting its engineering expertise and securing long-term returns through power purchase agreements. Additionally, Chinese companies have stakes in Cambodia’s nascent oil and mining ventures, though these are still limited. In agriculture, China has invested in farming and processing (like rubber plantations and sugar), partly to ensure a stable supply of commodities. The “Fish and Rice Corridor” initiative – a China-backed agricultural modernization program – exemplifies how China’s investment is boosting Cambodian farming productivity and food security . By developing Cambodia’s rich soil for exportable crops, China gains a stable source of imports (rice, fruit, fish) while helping Cambodia diversify its rural economy.
• Economic Aid and Soft Loans: Many Chinese investments in Cambodia blur the line with development aid. Beijing often provides concessional loans or grants for infrastructure – funding projects that might not be immediately profitable but have high developmental impact. Examples include rural roads, a new phosphate fertilizer plant, and the landmark Morodok Techo National Stadium on Phnom Penh’s outskirts – a $160 million Chinese-funded gift that hosted the 2023 Southeast Asian Games . These high-profile projects win China goodwill among the Cambodian public and government. From China’s perspective, such aid secures political loyalty and opens doors for its state-owned enterprises to win contracts. As of 2022, China accounted for about 41% of Cambodia’s $9.8 billion foreign debt (making it the largest lender) . Beijing’s willingness to finance big-ticket projects that others deem too risky has endeared it to Cambodian leaders looking to modernize their country quickly.

In summary, China’s economic motivations in Cambodia revolve around development synergy: providing capital and expertise where Cambodia needs it – infrastructure, industry, energy – and in turn gaining a loyal trading partner, investment opportunities for Chinese companies, and a showcase for the Belt and Road’s “win-win” development model.

Political and Strategic Interests

Beyond economics, China’s Cambodia policy is driven by significant political and strategic considerations. Cambodia is often seen as China’s closest strategic ally in ASEAN, and Beijing reaps important geopolitical benefits from this relationship:

• Influence in ASEAN: With 10 member states, ASEAN often operates by consensus – and China values having friendly voices like Cambodia within this bloc. On contentious regional issues, Cambodia has reliably sided with China. Notably, Phnom Penh has repeatedly blocked ASEAN statements critical of China’s claims in the South China Sea . In 2012 and 2016, when other ASEAN members sought a unified stance on the South China Sea disputes, Cambodia’s objection (widely seen as on China’s behalf) prevented a joint communiqué . Cambodian diplomats also oppose any ASEAN naval drills in the South China Sea that might be seen as anti-China . This support is invaluable to Beijing: it fractures ASEAN unity, giving China more leverage to deal with rival claimants one-on-one. Similarly, Cambodia has been vocal in endorsing China’s position on Taiwan, backing the One-China principle and denouncing “interference” on the Taiwan question . In international forums, Cambodia often votes with China, providing an additional friendly vote at the United Nations. All of this makes tiny Cambodia a significant political ally punching above its weight in regional diplomacy – a fact not lost on Chinese strategists who see Cambodia as a conduit for their influence in Southeast Asia .
• Strategic Access and Security Cooperation: Cambodia’s location on the Gulf of Thailand gives China a foothold near the strategically vital South China Sea shipping lanes. In recent years, there has been intense international scrutiny over the Ream Naval Base on Cambodia’s coast. China has funded upgrades at Ream, including dredging and construction of new facilities, raising U.S. suspicions that it might become a de facto Chinese naval outpost . In late 2023, Chinese navy vessels even made port calls at Ream – the first time Chinese warships docked there – although Cambodia insists no permanent foreign base is allowed by its constitution . Whether or not a formal base emerges, the deepened military cooperation is clear. Since 2016, China and Cambodia hold annual “Golden Dragon” joint military exercises, after Cambodia canceled similar drills with the U.S. in 2017 . China has also gifted military equipment, including naval vessels to Cambodia . From China’s perspective, these ties secure a friendly defense partner on mainland Southeast Asia and potentially extend China’s strategic reach into the Indian Ocean via the Thai Gulf. Some analysts even view projects like the proposed Funan Techo Canal (a $1.7 billion China-backed canal through Cambodia) in this light – as part of a vision to reroute trade away from the South China Sea chokepoints and reduce reliance on the Malacca Strait . While such grand plans remain speculative, there is no doubt that having Cambodia in its camp bolsters China’s overall security posture in the region.
• Diplomatic Support and Regime Security: The ruling parties of both countries share an ideological alignment that underpins their friendship. The Chinese Communist Party regards Cambodia’s long-ruling CPP as a “like-minded” regime – both authoritarian in style – and has cultivated elite-to-elite ties accordingly . Beijing’s “elite-centric approach” means it works closely with Cambodia’s leadership (Hun Sen’s family and inner circle), offering them political backing in exchange for loyalty . This has tangible benefits for both: Chinese investors gain direct access to decision-makers, speeding up projects and business deals, while Cambodian leaders receive investment that boosts their domestic legitimacy (often along with personal patronage benefits) . Importantly, China’s aid comes without Western-style criticism on human rights or governance. As one analyst noted, “Beijing does not care at all about Cambodia’s human rights abuses or lack of democracy, and that works well for the Cambodian government.” By shielding Cambodia from Western pressure – for instance, providing funds when the U.S. or EU impose sanctions – China helps secure the CPP’s hold on power. Cambodian officials openly appreciate this: Hun Sen has praised China for being a “friend in need” during tough times, never “intimidated by any threat” from other powers . In return, Cambodia champions China’s global initiatives (from the Belt and Road to the Global Development Initiative), and often echoes Chinese diplomatic positions. For example, Cambodia was one of the few in ASEAN to endorse China’s stance on issues like Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and has “staunchly supported” Beijing’s views on Taiwan since the 1990s . This loyal diplomacy gives China a reliable ally to showcase its model of South-South cooperation and to counter Western narratives in international forums.

In essence, the political-strategic rationale is that Cambodia is China’s foothold in Southeast Asia – a friendly nation that amplifies China’s voice in ASEAN and offers strategic real estate for China’s regional ambitions. For relatively little economic cost (given Cambodia’s small size), China gains a partner that “stands in support of China’s regional goals” . This asymmetry partly explains why China invests so heavily in Cambodia despite Cambodia’s modest economic clout: geopolitically, Cambodia punches above its weight as a dependable ally in China’s great-power competition playbook .

Impacts on Cambodia: Opportunities and Challenges

China’s investment boom has had profound effects on Cambodia’s economy and society. Many outcomes are positive and developmentally transformative, while others raise concerns about dependency and sovereignty. Below we analyze the key impacts:

Economic Growth and Development Gains

There is no doubt that Chinese capital has been a major driver of Cambodia’s rapid growth in the past decade. New infrastructure financed by China – roads, bridges, power plants, ports – has improved connectivity and reduced the cost of doing business. For example, the Phnom Penh–Sihanoukville Expressway is credited with “providing great benefits to Cambodia’s socio-economic development and tourism” by cutting travel times and boosting logistics efficiency . The new airports and upgraded highways enable more trade and tourists, helping diversify the economy. Industrial zones built with Chinese partnerships (like the Sihanoukville SEZ) have created manufacturing jobs and attracted factories that might otherwise bypass Cambodia. All this contributed to Cambodia’s pre-pandemic GDP growth which averaged around 7% annually – one of the fastest in the world, lifting Cambodia to lower-middle income status in 2015. Cambodian officials openly acknowledge that “China’s ongoing support remains vital to Cambodia’s socio-economic development and poverty reduction.” Chinese investments align with Cambodia’s goal to graduate from least-developed country status by 2030 and become a high-income country by 2050 . The trade boost from China is also significant: with the new free trade agreements, Cambodia’s agricultural exports to China (rice, fruits, etc.) have surged, benefitting farmers and agribusiness . Meanwhile, Chinese tourists (who numbered nearly 1 million in 2023) bring in revenue for hotels, restaurants and airlines . The designation of 2025 as the Cambodia-China Tourism Year promises even more visitors and cultural exchanges, further stimulating growth in the service sector. In short, Chinese investment has become a key pillar of Cambodia’s economic success story, providing hard infrastructure and market access that would have been hard to achieve so quickly otherwise.

Debt and Financial Risks

On the flip side, Cambodia’s reliance on Chinese financing has sparked concerns about debt sustainability and overreliance on one creditor. Cambodia’s public external debt owed to China stood at about $4 billion in 2023 (roughly 35–40% of total external debt) . This makes China by far Cambodia’s largest bilateral lender. Thus far, agencies like the IMF rate Cambodia’s debt distress risk as “low”, noting that overall debt (around 30% of GDP) is very manageable . The Cambodian finance ministry even reported no new borrowing from China in 2024, an unprecedented pause intended to keep debt levels in check . However, observers warn that if Cambodia continues to take large Chinese loans for big projects, it could face repayment difficulties down the road, especially if those projects don’t generate strong returns. The notion of a “debt-trap” – where Beijing could seize strategic assets if loans default – has been debated in Cambodia’s context. While there is no clear case of China taking over Cambodian assets, the risk to sovereignty is psychological: Cambodia might fear displeasing Beijing and become more malleable to China’s wishes to ensure debt relief or continued support. To mitigate this, Cambodia has started diversifying its sources of funding, courting Japan, South Korea, and multilateral banks for infrastructure aid . The government insists the debt is under control and mostly concessional (low-interest, long-term). The true test will be ensuring Chinese-funded projects are economically viable so that they “pay for themselves” over time – a strategy Cambodia is attempting by using public-private partnership models like build-operate-transfer (e.g. the expressway will be paid back by toll revenues over decades) . In summary, Chinese loans have accelerated development but also necessitate prudent management to avoid future financial strain.

Sovereignty and Foreign Policy Autonomy

The deepening dependence on China has raised questions about Cambodia’s policy autonomy and sovereignty. Critics argue that Cambodia has become so beholden to Beijing’s support that it occasionally subordinates its national interests to please China. For example, Cambodia’s controversial handling of South China Sea issues in ASEAN – effectively doing China’s bidding by blocking criticism of Beijing – is seen as a case where Cambodia traded regional solidarity for China’s favor . Likewise, allowing extensive Chinese economic enclaves (like long-term leases of land at Dara Sakor for a mega-tourism zone, or tacitly permitting Chinese security at Ream naval base) has fed a perception that Cambodia’s sovereignty is eroding. Opposition figures have warned of Cambodia becoming a “vassal state” or a “province” of China if trends continue unchecked. The ruling CPP dismisses such claims, but the concerns persist. On the other hand, Cambodian leaders leverage the China relationship to assert sovereignty in another way: by diversifying from Western dependence. They feel that friendship with China gives Cambodia more freedom to chart its own course without Western interference. As Hun Sen memorably said, “Was it my fault for being a friend of China and getting a result as today?”, defending his pivot to Beijing as delivering tangible benefits for Cambodians . Still, the Cambodian public and neighboring countries sometimes view Phnom Penh’s pro-Beijing tilt with wariness. The government under new Prime Minister Hun Manet (Hun Sen’s son, who took office in 2023) has signaled it will maintain strong China ties but also “recalibrate” to avoid overdependence . In practice, any shift will likely be subtle, as China remains the dominant investor. The tightrope for Cambodia is to enjoy Chinese economic gains without compromising its independent decision-making. So far, the CPP has managed this by loudly proclaiming neutrality and an “omni-directional” foreign policy (friend to all), even as its actions often align with China.

Social and Cultural Effects

On the societal level, China’s presence in Cambodia has brought both positive exchange and some friction. Chinese expatriates and tourists now form a visible community in cities like Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville. In Phnom Penh’s upscale districts, Chinese businesses, restaurants, and signage have proliferated. Many Cambodians have welcomed these newcomers for the opportunities they bring – a “craze for learning Chinese” took hold during the boom years when knowing Mandarin became a ticket to good jobs or business deals . By 2024, over 100,000 Cambodian students were studying the Chinese language in schools , encouraged even by government ministers. Cultural exchange programs have expanded, and 2024 was deemed the China-Cambodia “Year of People-to-People Exchange”, marking deepening mutual understanding . These are uplifting signs of grassroots friendship to complement the high-level ties.

However, the social impact hasn’t been uniformly rosy. The influx of Chinese money also brought less savory elements – notably a spike in organized crime and scams. Sihanoukville infamously became a “Wild West” by 2018–2019, with casino-driven growth accompanied by reports of criminal syndicates, money laundering, and lawlessness involving Chinese nationals. At one point, violent incidents between Chinese gangs were so frequent that the government had to ban online gambling to stem the tide . During the COVID-19 pandemic, revelations of large-scale online scam compounds run by criminal networks (often involving trafficked workers from China and other countries) shocked the public . These crimes – human trafficking and internet fraud – being linked to Chinese-run operations tarnished the image of Chinese investors. It even created fear within the long-established local Chinese community, some of whom began keeping a low profile (one overseas Chinese investor was advised “Don’t speak Chinese” openly due to rising stigma ). Nonetheless, it’s important to note that historically Cambodians have been more suspicious of other neighbors (Vietnam, Thailand) than of the Chinese, who have centuries-old communities in Cambodia that assimilated well . The government has cracked down on the criminal element and emphasized that “bad actors” do not represent all Chinese aid and investment. Many Cambodians still view Chinese investors favorably for the jobs and development they bring. The social challenge lies in ensuring better regulation and integration – so that local communities feel they benefit alongside Chinese enterprises, and cultural differences do not breed resentment. So far, there is a mix of admiration and anxiety: admiration for China’s role in Cambodia’s rise, and anxiety that too much foreign influence could undermine social cohesion or local livelihoods (for instance, soaring rents in Sihanoukville pushed out some locals during the boom). With proactive policies – e.g. mandating local hiring, policing crime, and cultural exchange – Cambodia aims to maximize the positive social impacts of Chinese investment while curbing the negatives.

Recent Developments (2024–2025)

The China-Cambodia partnership has continued to strengthen through 2024 and into 2025, marked by high-level visits and new initiatives. In late 2023, shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Hun Manet chose Beijing for his first official trip, underscoring continuity in Cambodia’s foreign policy . He met President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang, reaffirming Cambodia’s commitment to the “ironclad” friendship and signing cooperation agreements. Chinese leaders praised the smooth leadership transition in Phnom Penh and indicated full support for Hun Manet’s government, signaling that the close alliance transcends individual leaders. Indeed, Hun Sen (now Cambodia’s senate president) reassured Chinese officials in 2024 that “friendship with China is a consensus within the CPP which will not change” even with new generations in charge .

Economically, 2024 was a banner year. Bilateral trade expanded rapidly thanks to the RCEP and CCFTA trade pacts, with Cambodia’s exports to China rising over 20% and total trade approaching $15 billion . Chinese firms also ramped up investment: in 2024, 49.8% of all foreign investment in Cambodia (by value of projects approved) came from China . By the end of the year, nearly 3,000 Chinese companies were registered in Cambodia – a 20% increase from the year before . This contributed to the creation of new factories (over half of all factories in Cambodia are now Chinese-owned ) and helped the post-pandemic economic recovery gain speed. One striking development: Chinese FDI in 2023 doubled from the prior year, reaching $1.38 billion . This suggests a renewed investor confidence as borders reopened and new opportunities (like electric vehicle assembly and electronics) emerge. A Chinese automaker, BYD, announced plans in 2024 to set up an EV assembly plant in Cambodia – potentially a game-changer for industrial diversification .

On the strategic front, defense cooperation made headlines. In May 2024, Cambodia hosted another round of Golden Dragon military drills with China, while pointedly distancing itself from U.S. military engagements . In June, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Phnom Penh to attempt to “reset” relations, but analysts noted the U.S. was “on the back foot” as Cambodia had by then closely aligned with Beijing . Meanwhile, construction at Ream Naval Base continued quietly; by late 2024, satellite images and Cambodian statements suggested new facilities (built with Chinese assistance) were nearly finished, though Cambodian officials insist they alone will control the base. This ongoing saga will be watched in 2025, as any signs of permanent Chinese military presence could trigger regional alarm.

2025 was designated as the “China-Cambodia Year of Tourism,” a cultural initiative to boost two-way travel and goodwill . Early indicators are positive: Chinese tourist arrivals in Q1 2025 jumped over 50%, as direct flights resumed and group tours returned . A series of cultural festivals, trade expos, and exchange programs are planned throughout 2025 to celebrate the 65th anniversary of diplomatic ties. These feel-good events reinforce the narrative of a family-like friendship between the nations. Cambodian media frequently carries stories highlighting Chinese aid – for example, additional donations of COVID-19 vaccines, scholarships for students, or grants for demining unexploded ordnance – further cementing public appreciation for China’s contributions .

One noteworthy development is Cambodia’s attempt to balance its diplomacy more. While keeping China as a core partner, Hun Manet’s government has cautiously engaged other countries to avoid overdependence. In 2024, Cambodia mended some fences with Western nations (e.g. lobbying the U.S. to reinstate trade preferences, engaging in EU dialogues) and continued receiving significant aid from Japan and multilateral institutions. Analysts describe this as “recalibration, not realignment,” noting that Phnom Penh is hedging just enough to maximize benefits from all sides . However, the fundamental orientation remains clear: China is the primary economic engine and strategic guarantor for Cambodia. As a telling example, when Xi Jinping met Hun Manet, they agreed to build an “all-weather Cambodia-China community of shared future” and to upgrade cooperation in every field – essentially affirming that the partnership will only grow closer in the new era.

Conclusion

China’s heavy investment in Cambodia is driven by a combination of economic opportunity, strategic calculus, and historical affinity. For China, helping develop Cambodia’s infrastructure and economy expands Beijing’s influence in Southeast Asia and secures a steadfast ally on the international stage. For Cambodia, Chinese investment has been a powerful catalyst for growth – building roads, factories, and ports that are transforming the nation and improving livelihoods. Cambodian leaders from Hun Sen to Hun Manet view China as an indispensable partner in achieving their ambitious development goals, often encapsulating the sentiment with proverbs like “a friend in need is a friend indeed.”

The partnership is not without challenges. Cambodia must manage its rising debt to China and reassure its people that sovereignty will not be compromised. The government will need to address social issues arising from the investment influx – ensuring that the benefits (jobs, infrastructure, better services) reach ordinary Cambodians and that law and order keep pace with rapid growth. On China’s side, being a good partner will mean respecting Cambodia’s autonomy and sustainable development, so that the relationship fosters genuine mutual prosperity and goodwill.

Overall, the long-term trend points to even deeper ties. Both countries speak of a future together, building a “high-quality, high-level, and high-standard” community of shared destiny . The tone is optimistic: with China’s help, Cambodia envisions becoming a modern, connected, and thriving economy – a rare “win-win” story in a world often filled with great-power rivalry. As of 2025, the Cambodia-China alliance stands as a testament to how infrastructure and investment diplomacy can bind nations closely. If managed wisely, this bond can continue to inspire growth and stability in Cambodia, while giving China the regional friend and inspiration it seeks. In the words of a Cambodian minister celebrating a new highway, these achievements are “solid testament to our joint efforts in building a Cambodia–China community with a shared future” . The journey ahead looks bright, so long as both partners steer with care – balancing ambition with inclusivity – to ensure that the benefits of this bold partnership uplift both the Cambodian people and the broader region in an enduring, positive way.

Sources:

• China Briefing (Mar 2025), “China-Cambodia Ties: Boosting Trade, Investment, and Opportunities.” 
• Deutsche Welle (May 2024), “China builds strategic South China Sea foothold in Cambodia.” 
• Council on Foreign Relations (2024), “Why Is China Investing in a $1.7 Billion Canal in Cambodia?” 
• Xinhua News (Nov 2024), “Users of Chinese-invested expressway in Cambodia top 10 mln.” 
• Cambodianess News (Sept 2021), “Hun Sen Praises Ironclad Cambodia-China Friendship.” 
• The Diplomat (Dec 2024), “Don’t Speak Chinese: Stigma and Fear in Cambodia’s Chinese Community.” 
• BTI Transformation Index 2024 – Cambodia Report 
• Washington Post (July 2023), “West Point trained the heir to Cambodia’s autocracy. Who is Hun Manet?” 
• Others as cited in text above.