Introduction: Defining Digital Power vs. Cyber Power
Digital Power generally refers to an actor’s broad ability to leverage digital technology, data, and connectivity to influence others and achieve strategic goals. One concise definition describes digital power as “any actor’s ability to exploit digital data to help change the behavior of other actors on the international stage and to achieve its own ends.” This concept isn’t limited to nation-states; because digital networks are global and decentralized, all connected actors – including corporations and even individuals – can wield some degree of digital power . Digital power manifests in many forms: economic strength from tech industries, control over digital infrastructure and data flows, cultural influence through online media, and the capacity to set rules or standards in the digital domain.
Cyber Power, a closely related term, is often used to emphasize the security and military dimensions of power in cyberspace. The term can be defined broadly as a state’s “ability to protect and promote national interests in and through cyberspace” – encompassing defensive cybersecurity, the pursuit of economic and intelligence interests online, and the use of cyber capabilities to influence real-world events. In a more narrow sense focused on conflict, cyber power has been described as “a society’s organized capability to leverage digital technology for surveillance, exploitation, subversion, and coercion in international conflict.” In other words, cyber power includes the offensive tools and operations (like hacking, cyberattacks, and espionage) and the defensive measures to secure one’s own digital systems.
Relationship and Differences: Digital power and cyber power overlap substantially – indeed, some analyses use the terms interchangeably . Both deal with influence via digital means. However, there is a useful distinction in emphasis. Digital power is a broader umbrella that covers the full spectrum of influence gained through digital technologies: economic competitiveness, information dissemination, control of data and networks, and even “soft” cultural power. Cyber power, on the other hand, often focuses on the security realm of cyberspace – it highlights military and intelligence capabilities, cybersecurity strength, and the ability to both attack and defend in the cyber domain. In practice, robust digital power (e.g. a strong tech industry, large digital economy, and global platforms) provides the foundation for cyber power by supplying the infrastructure, talent, and resources. Conversely, exercising cyber power (through cyber operations or defense) is one way to project digital power as a tool of statecraft. To summarize, digital power is about wielding influence via digital technology at large, whereas cyber power zeroes in on exploiting and securing cyberspace itself as an instrument of national power. In the sections below, we explore multiple dimensions of how these forms of power play out – from geopolitics and military strategy to economics, security, technology, and culture – and how leading nations exemplify digital and cyber power in action.
Geopolitical Significance of Digital and Cyber Power
Digital and cyber capabilities have become critical instruments of national power in geopolitics. Scholars note that digital technologies are no longer peripheral in world affairs – they are now central to shaping global power dynamics. The rise of the digital realm has, in effect, rewritten the traditional laws of power by enabling new actors and new modes of influence . Notably, major multinational tech companies themselves have emerged as “independent geopolitical actors” alongside states . For example, platforms like Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and China’s Alibaba wield enormous influence over communication, commerce, and information flows worldwide. These corporate giants influence trade patterns, domestic governance (through the services they provide), and even global norms. In fact, entire governments now depend on foreign cloud providers – “Amazon Web Services (AWS) supplies cloud infrastructure to entire governments” – creating a form of platform dependency . When a state’s critical services run on another country’s digital platforms, it introduces strategic vulnerabilities, as the dominant platform owner (or its home nation) could leverage that dependency in geopolitical disputes . Control of undersea internet cables, satellite networks, and technical standards for the internet can likewise confer geopolitical leverage to the controlling nation.
Digital power as influence: Nations with strong digital power can project influence without traditional military force. They might do so by controlling key digital infrastructure or data (often compared to controlling strategic resources like oil in earlier eras ) or by dominating the global narrative through online media. For instance, controlling a critical digital chokepoint – such as payment networks or app stores – can be as geopolitically significant today as controlling sea lanes was in the past . The United States’ ability to impose sanctions that cut off adversaries from international payment systems is one example of digital-economic leverage akin to a form of coercive power . At the same time, digital power can be exercised more subtly: states are able to shape perceptions abroad via social media and online content, exporting their culture or political values. A country that hosts globally popular social media or entertainment platforms (for example, the U.S. with YouTube, Hollywood streaming content, or social networks) has a soft-power advantage in disseminating its culture and viewpoint.
Cyber power as influence and coercion: Cyber capabilities add another layer to geopolitics by enabling espionage and coercive actions short of conventional war. State-backed hackers can steal confidential information from rival governments (providing diplomatic or military leverage), or intellectual property from foreign companies (providing economic and technological edge). Cyber espionage has become a staple of great-power competition. Cyber tools can also directly interfere in other nations’ internal affairs: for example, conducting cyber operations to influence elections or public opinion. A notorious case is Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, where Russian operatives hacked emails and waged social media disinformation campaigns to sway public opinion. Indeed, information warfare is a key component of cyber power. As one analysis notes, Russia has used Facebook and other platforms to “sabotage Ukraine and subvert election security to weaken liberal democracies,” illustrating how cyber means can achieve geopolitical aims by undermining an adversary from within . Unlike traditional military influence (which requires physical presence or economic sanctions), cyber operations can project power instantaneously across the globe with a degree of anonymity. Crucially, the barrier to entry for cyber power is relatively low – even nations with modest resources can develop disruptive cyber capabilities. A country need not be a wealthy industrialized power to field a serious cyber force; as Ralph Langner observes, “technologically underdeveloped countries like Iran, Tunisia, and North Korea – all of which maintain cyber armies – can still pose a credible threat to the security of other nations” . This has leveled aspects of the playing field, allowing smaller or rogue states to “punch above their weight” in international politics via cyber means .
Norms and alliances: Digital and cyber power also factor into the shaping of global norms and alliances. Competing visions for the internet reflect geopolitical competition. Western democracies have generally promoted an open, globally interconnected internet with multi-stakeholder governance (involving the private sector and civil society), viewing the free flow of information as beneficial. In contrast, authoritarian powers like China and Russia advocate “cyber sovereignty,” insisting on each state’s right to control and regulate its national cyberspace. China, for instance, has made cyber sovereignty a cornerstone of its cyber diplomacy – arguing that countries should be free to choose their own internet regulations and content controls without outside interference . This has geopolitical appeal to many developing countries that resent Western dominance in cyberspace and seek an alternative model . Through forums like the United Nations and its Belt and Road Initiative’s Digital Silk Road, China is actively promoting its vision of state-centric internet governance and exporting its digital infrastructure and surveillance technologies to partner states . The geopolitical contest thus extends to setting the rules of the road in cyberspace – whether the future internet will be more fragmented and state-controlled, or remain more open and globally governed. In summary, digital and cyber power have become instruments of national influence: they can enhance a nation’s geo-economic clout, enable new forms of coercion and espionage, and shape the ideological battle over how the digital world should be ordered.
Military Strategies: Cyber Power in Defense and Offense
Modern military strategy has fully absorbed cyber power as an integral component of national defense, offense, and deterrence. Cyberspace is now commonly referred to as the “fifth domain” of warfare (alongside land, sea, air, and space) . This means that militaries plan for cyber operations just as they do for conventional operations, and success in conflict can depend on one’s cyber capabilities.
Integration into defense and offense: Many nations have established dedicated cyber command units within their armed forces – for example, the United States’ U.S. Cyber Command, the United Kingdom’s Joint Cyber Unit, China’s People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, and similar structures in dozens of countries. As of the late 2010s, over 100 countries were reported to be building or maintaining military cyber units (“cyber armies”) , highlighting how ubiquitous cyber warfare has become. These units are tasked both with defensive operations (protecting military networks and critical infrastructure from enemy hackers) and offensive cyber operations that can disrupt, degrade, or spy on an adversary’s assets. In practical terms, offensive cyber actions have already been used in military contexts: disabling an opponent’s air defense systems, knocking out command-and-control networks, sabotaging weapons development, or blinding intelligence systems. A famous example is the Stuxnet attack (discovered in 2010) on Iran’s nuclear program – a sophisticated cyber weapon that physically damaged nuclear centrifuges via malware. This attack, reportedly a covert U.S.-Israeli operation, delayed Iran’s nuclear enrichment and demonstrated that cyber weapons could produce effects analogous to a military strike without a shot being fired . Indeed, analysts note that a cyber attack can achieve an effect similar to a conventional strike on infrastructure, with some advantages. For instance, “the effect of disabling critical infrastructure could be achieved by cyber or a conventional weapons attack, and a cyber attack might be preferred since its effect could be reversible in a way a missile strike is not.” In other words, militaries might opt for a cyber offensive tool because it can be precisely targeted and potentially temporary (e.g. disrupting power to a facility for a period, rather than permanently destroying it).
Deterrence and strategic ambiguity: Cyber power also plays into national deterrence strategies, though cyber deterrence is notoriously complex. In the nuclear era, deterrence rested on visible capabilities and clear attribution (e.g. satellite images of missile silos). By contrast, cyber capabilities are often invisible until used, and attackers can obscure their identities. As a result, attribution is difficult – states often cannot be immediately sure who is behind a cyber intrusion – which complicates retaliatory threats. Moreover, because cyber arsenals are developed in secret, rivals cannot easily gauge each other’s true capabilities, undermining the transparency that traditional deterrence relies on . Despite these challenges, countries do attempt to establish cyber deterrence by signaling their prowess and resolve. Some have publicly announced that they reserve the right to respond to cyberattacks with conventional force, thereby warning adversaries that major cyber aggression could trigger serious retaliation. Alliances like NATO have declared that a particularly severe cyberattack could invoke Article 5 collective defense, treating it akin to an armed attack. In practice, states also engage in “forward defense” or persistent engagement in cyberspace: for example, U.S. Cyber Command has adopted a strategy of continuously counter-hacking adversaries (“Defend Forward”) to disrupt plots before they hit U.S. networks. This blurs the line between peace and conflict, but is seen as necessary to counter constant, low-grade cyber threats from opponents.
Cyber offense as a force multiplier: A well-executed cyber operation can amplify conventional military campaigns. Prior to or during physical conflicts, cyberattacks might be launched to confuse enemy communications, mislead their radar and sensors, or sabotage logistics (for instance, hacking an adversary’s railway signaling to delay troop mobilization). Russia has employed coordinated cyber-attacks alongside kinetic military moves – during its incursions into Ukraine (2014 onward), Russian actors executed waves of cyberattacks on Ukrainian media, government offices, and infrastructure to sow chaos and pave the way for ground operations. Such integrated cyber warfare tactics illustrate how cyber power enhances traditional military power. Conversely, reliance on digital systems creates new vulnerabilities for militaries: a technologically advanced force can be hamstrung if its networks are penetrated at a critical moment. This dynamic spurs investment in cyber defense for militaries – ensuring encrypted communications, hardened networks, and backup systems in case of cyber outages.
Cyber deterrence and offense in practice: It is worth noting that while cyber weapons can cause disruption, many experts argue they cannot single-handedly “win” a war – at least not yet . Cyber attacks tend to be temporary or reversible, and once discovered, the element of surprise is lost. Thus, cyber power is often seen as complementary to traditional military power, not a complete replacement . However, its importance is only growing. Military planners now treat cyber operations as a standard part of campaign planning. They also grapple with new strategic questions: How to signal cyber capabilities without giving away secrets? What red lines to draw for cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure? How to prevent escalation if a cyber exchange spirals out of control? These questions make cyber strategy a delicate part of national security. In summary, cyber power is firmly embedded in military strategy today – nations build it into their force structure for both offense (cyberattacks, information warfare) and defense (cybersecurity, resilience), and they view it as an essential element of deterrence in the digital age.
Economic Implications: Digital Infrastructure as a Source of Power
In the 21st-century economy, controlling digital infrastructure and amassing technological prowess translate directly into national power and competitive advantage. The world’s leading economies are those that have harnessed digitalization – building vibrant tech sectors, dominating high-tech markets, and accumulating vast stores of data. Economic digital power can be seen in the outsized global role of certain countries’ technology firms and platforms. For instance, American companies have a commanding position in many digital domains: as of a few years ago, 17 U.S. tech firms had market capitalizations over $50 billion (versus only one in Europe) , and U.S. firms dominate fields like cloud computing (Amazon Web Services holding ~45% of the public cloud market) and internet search (Google with ~90% global search share) . This concentration gives the United States enormous influence over global digital services. Similarly, China has cultivated its own tech giants (Tencent, Alibaba, Huawei, etc.) and now boasts the world’s second-largest digital economy , with companies that lead in e-commerce, 5G telecommunications, and digital payments across large swaths of Asia and beyond.
Control of data and platforms: Data has been dubbed “the new oil” because of its value in powering artificial intelligence and digital services. However, the ability to monetize and utilize data is highly unequal globally. According to a United Nations report, “while data is generated worldwide, the ability to monetize that data is highly concentrated in a handful of developed economies.” In practice, this means much of the data produced by users in developing countries ends up stored and processed in servers owned by companies in the U.S. or a few other tech-leading nations . For example, a smartphone user in Africa or South America might generate data that is ultimately harvested and monetized by a Silicon Valley firm, with little benefit returning to the user’s home country . This dynamic reinforces economic dependency: nations without strong digital industries become merely consumers and raw data providers, while those with digital power reap disproportionate rewards. It also creates structural barriers for latecomers, widening the digital divide . Recognizing this, some countries push for data localization (keeping data within national borders) and investment in their own digital infrastructure to capture more value domestically.
Beyond data, ownership of physical and logical infrastructure – such as semiconductor fabrication, operating systems, app ecosystems, and cloud data centers – confers strategic economic advantage. Semiconductor chips are a telling example: they are essential to all digital products, but only a few countries (like the U.S., South Korea, Taiwan, and increasingly China) have the capability to produce cutting-edge chips. This has led to intense geo-economic competition, with countries employing industrial policies (subsidies, export controls, etc.) to secure supply chains for critical tech. The recent U.S. “CHIPS Act” and similar initiatives aim to onshore chip manufacturing for security and economic resilience, while China’s “Made in China 2025” plan explicitly seeks to achieve self-sufficiency and dominance in advanced technologies. Control over telecommunications infrastructure is another economic lever with security implications: for instance, China’s Huawei became a world leader in 5G network equipment, prompting strategic concerns in the West about dependence on Chinese hardware (leading some countries to restrict Huawei’s role in their 5G rollouts). The nation that supplies a network’s backbone could, in theory, exert influence or intelligence-gathering through that position.
Geo-economic influence: Countries strong in digital industries can project power by exporting their technology and setting standards. For example, U.S. and European firms defined many early internet standards and continue to influence norms through bodies like the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Now China is asserting itself by promoting its technical standards in international telecom and AI forums, aligning with its companies’ products. Additionally, nations leverage their digital corporations in diplomacy – what some call “techno-economic statecraft.” The offerings of big tech firms can be part of trade deals or development aid (e.g. offering cloud services, smart city systems, or surveillance technology to partner countries). This builds spheres of influence: a country that adopts another’s digital systems may become locked into that ecosystem (due to compatibility, contracts, or skills), tilting its allegiance. One vivid concept is “platform dependence”: when states depend on foreign-owned digital platforms for vital services, they incur strategic vulnerabilities . For example, a small country whose government and businesses rely heavily on a U.S. or Chinese cloud provider might find itself pressured in foreign policy if that provider’s home country decides to restrict access. There is now awareness that digital infrastructure is critical infrastructure, and controlling it yields leverage. Joseph Nye has pointed out that disrupting an adversary’s financial systems or access to digital commerce can be a potent geopolitical weapon – just as impactful as cutting off oil supplies or shipping lanes was in the past .
Economic security and policy: With so much at stake, digital power has become a priority in economic policy. Governments are investing in R&D for AI, quantum computing, and other frontier tech, understanding that technological leadership drives long-term growth and power. We also see competition in setting the rules for the digital economy. The European Union, for example, wields a form of normative digital power through its regulatory frameworks (like the General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR). By enforcing high standards on data privacy and digital markets, the EU can influence global business practices (the “Brussels effect”), although Europe’s own tech sector is relatively small compared to the U.S. and China. Some analysts note that Europe’s ability to set rules hasn’t yet translated into true digital hegemony because of limited homegrown tech capacity . Nonetheless, the tussle over digital trade rules, taxation of tech giants, and control of online content moderation are all economic dimensions of digital power. Countries adept at navigating these issues – protecting their interests while fostering innovation – will solidify their power. In summary, economic digital power comes from being at the cutting edge of technology and controlling significant parts of the digital ecosystem, which in turn yields both wealth and geopolitical influence.
Cybersecurity and Defense: Protecting the Digital Domain
As cyber threats proliferate, cybersecurity has become a paramount concern for states, organizations, and individuals alike – it is the defensive facet of cyber power. In a world where critical infrastructure (power grids, hospitals, finance, transportation) and sensitive data are all online, the ability to secure those assets is as important to national security as guarding borders and physical assets. A nation strong in cyber defense can deter adversaries and protect its economy; one that is weak becomes a ripe target for espionage, sabotage, and criminal exploitation.
National cybersecurity strategies: Most countries have developed national cybersecurity strategies that outline how they will secure their digital realm. Common elements include: protecting government networks and critical infrastructure, collaborating with the private sector (since most infrastructure is privately owned) to improve resilience, developing rapid incident response capabilities, and educating citizens on cyber hygiene. Governments have created specialized cyber defense agencies or centers – for example, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and similar national CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams) worldwide – to coordinate defenses and share threat intelligence. At the international level, countries share information on cyber threats through alliances (e.g. the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence) and work to establish norms against certain attacks (for instance, agreements that critical civilian infrastructure should be off-limits for cyberattacks in peacetime).
One measure of national commitment is budget: the United States, for instance, earmarked at least $17.4 billion in 2020 for cybersecurity-related activities across the government , a figure that has only grown since. Such funding supports not just network security tools but also the development of skilled cyber personnel and advanced research. Countries like Israel and Estonia integrate cybersecurity deeply into their national culture – Estonia turned a 2007 massive cyberattack (which knocked offline its banks and government sites) into a catalyst for building one of the most cyber-secure digital societies in the world, including backup systems and e-residency programs with strong encryption.
Corporate and individual security: Organizations (from multinational corporations down to local hospitals) are on the frontlines of cyber defense, since they are often the direct targets of attacks. Best practices have emerged: strong access controls, encryption of sensitive data, regular software updates and patching, network monitoring, and incident response planning. However, even well-resourced companies struggle to fend off advanced persistent threats that may be backed by nation-states. The human factor is often the weakest link – hence widespread efforts to train employees against phishing and to promote basic “cyber hygiene” (using robust passwords, two-factor authentication, etc.). For individuals, cybersecurity means protecting personal data and devices: using antivirus software, being cautious with suspicious links, and safeguarding one’s digital identity. At all levels, awareness and preparedness are key, since completely preventing intrusions is nearly impossible; resilience (the ability to quickly detect, isolate, and recover from incidents) is the goal.
The evolving threat landscape: Cyber threats range from espionage (stealing secrets), crime (ransomware extortion, identity theft), hacktivism, to full-blown sabotage (as seen in malware like Stuxnet or Russian attacks on Ukrainian power grids). A sobering reality is that many high-profile breaches succeed without ultra-sophisticated methods. Security experts have observed that time and again, major cyber attacks have exploited well-known vulnerabilities or simple tactics, rather than undiscovered “zero-day” exploits . For example, attackers often take advantage of poor password practices, unpatched software, or phishing emails to gain entry – methods that are preventable with good cyber hygiene. Moreover, many industrial control systems were not designed with security in mind (some even lack basic authentication), making them soft targets . This implies that a lot of cyber defense is about getting the basics right. As one analysis put it, high-profile attacks have frequently “accomplished their objectives using well-known exploits that have circulated on the internet for years.” Therefore, investing in routine security maintenance can thwart a large fraction of threats.
On the other hand, elite threat actors do possess advanced tools – and the rise of zero-day markets (where unknown software vulnerabilities are bought and sold) means well-funded attackers can spring surprises on even diligent defenders. There is concern over emerging threats like supply chain attacks (as seen in the SolarWinds incident, where attackers compromised a trusted software update to breach many organizations at once) and the potential of AI-enhanced attacks. Ransomware attacks have surged, hitting hospitals, pipelines, and city governments, which underscores that cyber defense is also public safety and economic security. Governments are increasingly treating ransomware gangs (even if criminal) as national security threats, especially when they are harbored by hostile states. This has led to more aggressive international cooperation in law enforcement and, in some cases, offensive cyber actions to dismantle criminal infrastructure.
Cyber power in defense: Just as offense is a part of cyber power, so is the ability to withstand and recover from attacks. A truly cyber-powerful nation is one that not only can attack others, but can effectively defend itself. Some indices, like the International Telecommunication Union’s Global Cybersecurity Index, attempt to rank countries by their cybersecurity capabilities and preparedness . Strong cyber defenses can serve as a deterrent: if adversaries know a target is hardened and that their attack will likely fail or be discovered, they may think twice. Defense also includes the idea of resilience – ensuring critical services (water, electricity, communications) can continue or be quickly restored even under cyber attack. Techniques like network segmentation, redundancy (backup systems), and “chaos engineering” (stress-testing systems under attack scenarios) are being adopted to bolster resilience.
In sum, cybersecurity is the shield side of cyber power. It involves an ongoing cycle: anticipating threats, protecting systems, detecting breaches rapidly, and responding effectively. The actors in this space include government agencies, private sector security firms, and everyday users. Their combined efforts determine how safe the digital environment is. As cyberspace becomes ever more intertwined with daily life and national wellbeing, cybersecurity has rightly been elevated to a core national priority. Those nations and organizations that excel in cyber defense not only protect themselves but also enhance their standing and credibility on the global stage as secure and reliable partners in the digital age.
Technological Components Underpinning Digital and Cyber Power
Digital and cyber power are built upon a foundation of key technologies. These technologies serve as the tools and enablers that allow states (and other actors) to project power in and through cyberspace. Some of the most critical components include:
- Broadband and Telecommunications Infrastructure: Ubiquitous high-speed internet connectivity (fiber optic cables, 5G wireless networks, satellite internet) is the skeleton of the digital world. Control over telecom infrastructure can equate to control over information flows. For example, 5G networks are not only economically significant but also strategically sensitive – who builds and operates a country’s 5G network (e.g. Huawei vs. Ericsson/Nokia) has been a matter of national security debate. Countries with advanced, secure, and extensive digital infrastructure have a baseline digital power advantage, and those exporting this infrastructure can extend their influence (as China is doing via its global 5G and fiber projects).
- Computing Power and Semiconductors: The ability to design and manufacture advanced microchips and computers is a linchpin of digital power. Semiconductors are in everything from smartphones to missiles. Nations that lead in chip technology (like the U.S., South Korea, Taiwan, and potentially China in the near future) effectively control a resource every bit as strategic as oil or steel in previous eras. This is why we see high-tech export controls and investment in domestic chip fabs – it’s about maintaining a technological edge. High-performance computing (including emerging quantum computing) also falls in this category; quantum computers, for instance, could break current encryption or enable new secure communication, giving immense cyber advantage to the pioneers.
- Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data Analytics: AI is a force multiplier in both the digital economy and cyber operations. Countries investing heavily in AI research and applications aim to lead in fields like autonomous systems, intelligent manufacturing, and data-driven decision-making. In terms of cyber power, AI algorithms can assist with cyber defense (automatically detecting anomalies or intrusions, sifting through vast data to pinpoint threats) and also with offense (for example, automating the scanning of networks for vulnerabilities or crafting more convincing phishing messages at scale). AI also enables advanced surveillance (facial recognition, pattern analysis) which some states use for internal security and control. The nation that masters AI gains not just economic productivity but also sharper tools for intelligence and information dominance.
- Cyber Weapons and Tools: These include the malware, exploits, and platforms used for conducting cyber operations. High-end cyber weapons might be stockpiled exploits (including zero-days) that can penetrate secure systems, custom malware designed to cause physical effects (as Stuxnet did), or the infrastructure for botnets and distributed attacks. Developing such tools requires top-notch technical talent and often, significant resources (for research and testing), which is why only a handful of states are considered top-tier cyber powers in terms of offensive toolkit. Additionally, encryption and cryptography are crucial technologies on both sides – strong encryption tools empower secure communications (and thus digital freedom and secure commerce), whereas codebreaking capabilities are a strategic asset for intelligence agencies. The ongoing race between quantum computing and “post-quantum” encryption exemplifies this technological contest.
- Surveillance and Cyber Intelligence Systems: On the defensive side, this includes intrusion detection systems, threat intelligence platforms, and monitoring tools that help defenders see and react to threats in real time. On the offensive/espionage side, it includes an array of surveillance tech: from signals intelligence satellites to internet monitoring systems that filter or tap data. For example, many countries employ AI surveillance: combining cameras, facial recognition, and social media monitoring. These technologies enable authorities to track dissidents or threats, but raise human rights issues. Observers warn that AI-powered surveillance has “empowered governments seeking greater control with tools that entrench non-democracy,” essentially bolstering authoritarian power to monitor and suppress opposition . Thus, the spread of advanced surveillance tech is a double-edged sword in international relations – a tool of internal control for some, and a concern for others who see it undermining democratic values.
- Space-Based and Critical Infrastructure Technologies: Many aspects of digital power rely on space assets – GPS for navigation, satellites for communication and earth observation. The ability to launch and maintain satellites (and potentially to disable others’ satellites via cyber or jamming attacks) factors into cyber power. Similarly, emerging tech like the Internet of Things (IoT) – billions of networked devices from appliances to industrial sensors – will both generate new opportunities (data, automation) and new vulnerabilities. A country’s capacity to secure IoT and exploit it for efficiency could set it apart. The concept of “smart cities,” which rely on networked infrastructure, further ties technological modernity to security: those who can build and protect smart grids, intelligent transportation, and so on will have safer, more efficient societies.
In essence, digital and cyber power rest on a nation’s technological prowess and innovation ecosystem. Investment in STEM education, tech startups, cyber R&D labs, and robust digital infrastructure all contribute to power. Technological components are interlinked – advances in one (say AI) can magnify capabilities in another (cybersecurity or military autonomous drones). This is why global competitions like the “AI race” or the contest for semiconductor supremacy are seen as contests for future power. The nations at the forefront of these technologies will not only enjoy economic growth but also have the best tools to secure their interests and project power in the digital domain.
Soft Power in the Digital Age: Culture, Information, and Perception
Beyond hard capabilities, the digital era has transformed the landscape of soft power – the ability to shape preferences, values, and perceptions through attraction or persuasion rather than coercion. Digital media and cyber channels have become primary battlegrounds for narratives and public opinion, both domestically and internationally.
Digital culture and influence: Countries with vibrant digital content creation industries (film, music, gaming, social media) can project their culture globally with unprecedented speed. American social media platforms, for example, carry not just entertainment but often American cultural norms to billions of users worldwide. The global popularity of Hollywood movies, Netflix series, or even social media influencers contributes to American soft power by making its culture familiar and appealing. Likewise, South Korea’s “K-wave” (K-pop music, dramas, etc.) spread through YouTube and streaming services, significantly raising South Korea’s cultural profile. This kind of digital cultural diffusion can strengthen a country’s image and sway foreign publics in its favor without direct government intervention – it’s the classic soft power dynamic amplified by digital connectivity.
Information control and censorship: On the flip side, some states use digital tools to control the narrative within their own borders (and sometimes beyond). Authoritarian regimes have developed sophisticated censorship systems (like China’s Great Firewall) to filter what information citizens can access online, thereby shaping their worldviews to align with state narratives. They also flood their domestic internet with pro-government messaging (sometimes employing paid commentators or “bot” accounts) to drown out dissenting voices. The digital realm allows for near-total surveillance and control of information in ways that were not possible before, enabling what’s sometimes called “digital authoritarianism.” This internal use of cyber power secures regime stability and cultural hegemony domestically, at the cost of freedom of expression. It also has international implications: by proving that controlling the internet is possible at scale, these regimes inspire or assist others in doing the same. For example, China’s model of cyber sovereignty and internet control is being exported or emulated by other governments that wish to manage information tightly .
Global influence campaigns and disinformation: Perhaps the most contentious soft-power arena is the battle over truth and narrative on social media. State and non-state actors alike engage in influence operations: coordinated efforts to sway public opinion or disrupt societies by spreading tailored propaganda or false information (disinformation) online. These campaigns often target foreign audiences. Russia’s disinformation operations are a case in point – from sowing discord in U.S. and European elections to spreading propaganda narratives in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Such campaigns exploit the open nature of social networks, using fake personas and automated bots to amplify divisive content. Cyber power and soft power converge here, as technical skills (hacking, botnets) are used to achieve psychological and political effects. Joseph Nye described cyber power as hybrid, combining “coercive capabilities, such as launching cyberattacks, with persuasive capabilities, such as shaping narratives and winning public opinion through online platforms.” For example, a cyber operation might steal and leak compromising documents (a coercive act), and then a disinformation campaign uses those leaks to spin a damaging story in the media (a persuasive act). The invisible influence of such tactics can be profound: “influence campaigns such as disinformation on social media can subtly alter political outcomes without direct attribution,” meaning the public may never fully realize they were manipulated .
Soft power vs. “sharp” power: While soft power is traditionally benign (attraction through culture and ideals), the digital age has given rise to what some call “sharp power” – manipulative information wielded by authoritarian actors to undermine democracies. The lines blur between genuine cultural outreach and covert influence. Democratic nations are thus faced with defending their information space without undermining the free speech that is their strength. Efforts include media literacy programs to help citizens spot fake news, and greater transparency requirements on social media political ads or bot accounts. Meanwhile, authoritarian states continue to invest in their state media and social media strategies to promote their version of events globally (for instance, China’s expanding presence on Western social platforms via diplomats and state media accounts to tell the “China story”).
Public diplomacy and digital engagement: On a more positive note, governments also use digital channels for legitimate public diplomacy. Foreign ministries tweet in multiple languages to connect with foreign populations directly. International development organizations leverage online platforms to share the success stories of their aid projects, hoping to win hearts and minds. During crises, countries use social media to convey their stance or to rally international support. The accessibility of digital communication means a savvy message can go viral worldwide, amplifying a country’s soft power outreach far beyond what traditional broadcasts could achieve.
In conclusion, the digital realm has become the new theatre for soft power contests. Control of information = control of the narrative, and in a connected world, narratives can cross borders in an instant. Those who can successfully navigate and shape the information environment hold a significant advantage. Whether it’s done through attractive culture and values that draw others in, or through manipulative propaganda that confuses and divides, is a reflection of the actor’s intentions and system of governance. The challenge for the international community is that both occur simultaneously. Thus, understanding digital and cyber power requires not just looking at armies of hackers or big data centers, but also at TikTok trends, Twitter wars, and the hearts and minds of the global citizenry.
Case Studies: National Exemplars of Digital and Cyber Power
To illustrate how digital and cyber power manifest in practice, consider several countries often cited as leading powers in the digital/cyber domain: the United States, China, Russia, and Israel. Each demonstrates a different mix of capabilities and strategies:
United States
The United States is widely regarded as a top-tier actor in both digital and cyber power. On the digital front, the U.S. hosts many of the world’s most powerful tech companies and platforms – from Apple and Microsoft to Google, Amazon, and Facebook. This dominance is reflected in the global usage share of American platforms (e.g. Google’s search engine accounts for over 90% of mobile searches worldwide ). Such market control gives the U.S. significant geo-economic leverage; U.S. firms influence global trade flows and even domestic operations of other nations (for instance, many governments rely on services like Microsoft software or AWS cloud). The U.S. also has an unrivaled innovation ecosystem (Silicon Valley and beyond) which keeps it at the cutting edge of key technologies like AI, semiconductor design, and biotech. This innovative capacity translates into economic power and the ability to set technological standards. However, the U.S. does face challenges – its open internet model has been exploited by foreign disinformation campaigns, and it must constantly invest to maintain its edge as other countries rise.
In terms of cyber power, the U.S. possesses both formidable offensive capabilities and strong (if not foolproof) defenses. The U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency (NSA) are at the core of American cyber operations. They reportedly conduct a range of activities: from offensive operations to counter adversaries’ cyber espionage (e.g. disrupting foreign hackers) to cyber espionage of their own (monitoring communications worldwide). American cyber units have been involved in some of the most sophisticated cyber operations known – for example, U.S. intelligence, along with Israel, is widely believed to have orchestrated the Stuxnet malware attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities . Strategically, the U.S. emphasizes a doctrine of “defend forward,” meaning it actively probes and counters threats before they hit American networks. On defense, the U.S. has invested heavily in securing federal networks and critical infrastructure in partnership with industry. Still, high-profile breaches (such as the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain hack by suspected Russian actors, or ransomware attacks on U.S. pipelines) show that no defense is perfect. The U.S. has been pushing for international norms in cyberspace, but also making clear it can and will use its cyber arsenal if needed. It also leads in cyber alliances – for instance, it works with allies through NATO on cyber defense and with the Five Eyes intelligence partners on cyber intelligence sharing. In short, the U.S. leverages its digital power (tech dominance, innovation) to support its cyber power (military and intelligence capabilities), making it arguably the “pre-eminent cyber power” in the world today .
China
China has rapidly ascended in the ranks of digital powers, propelled by deliberate state strategy and a massive domestic market. China now boasts the second-largest digital economy and is home to tech behemoths that rival (and in some cases surpass) Western companies in scale – examples include Tencent (social media and gaming), Alibaba (e-commerce), and Huawei (telecom equipment). The Chinese government has actively fostered these giants and shielded them from foreign competition at home, allowing an entire parallel Chinese digital ecosystem to flourish (with Baidu instead of Google, WeChat instead of WhatsApp, etc.). This gives China tremendous internal digital leverage: more than 1 billion internet users under a tightly controlled network. Internally, China wields digital power to monitor and shape its society – through the Great Firewall blocking outside content, an extensive censorship regime, and cutting-edge surveillance (hundreds of millions of cameras combined with AI facial recognition form the backbone of a social credit system and other control mechanisms). These tools help maintain regime stability and are a model of digital authoritarian control.
Externally, China is leveraging its digital prowess for geopolitical and economic gain. Through its Digital Silk Road initiative, China invests in digital infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and Europe – building telecom networks, selling smart city and surveillance systems, and laying fiber optic cables. By doing so, China not only opens markets for its firms but also potentially increases other countries’ dependency on Chinese technology and standards. In international forums, China has become a leading advocate for cyber sovereignty, essentially proposing norms that favor state control over the internet .
In terms of cyber power, China is considered among the top tier (often ranked just below or alongside the U.S.). It has a very active cyber-espionage apparatus: Chinese state-linked hacking groups have been known to conduct large-scale intellectual property theft, hacking foreign companies and research institutions to benefit Chinese industries . One example was the breach of Western multinational firms and government databases, often attributed to units within the PLA or the Ministry of State Security, to steal designs and trade secrets (everything from wind turbine technology to defense blueprints). This systematic cyber espionage has been so extensive that it fueled tensions and even led to a 2015 U.S.-China agreement (somewhat effective for a while) to curb theft of commercial secrets. China’s military cyber branch (integrated under the Strategic Support Force) also focuses on military cyber warfare capabilities. Chinese cyber units could, in a conflict, launch attacks on adversary communication networks, satellites, or critical infrastructure. The consensus is that China’s offensive cyber capability is sophisticated and growing, though it may not yet match the covert sophistication of U.S. or Russian operations. Defensively, China’s approach is unique: by heavily controlling inbound and outbound internet traffic (the Great Firewall), it reduces exposure to certain attacks and foreign influence, albeit at the cost of openness. Domestically, cyber defenses protect government and industry, and China has been developing its own cybersecurity sector (including indigenous antivirus companies and even bug bounty programs) to reduce reliance on foreign security tools.
Overall, China exemplifies a case where digital economic might and authoritarian control translate into cyber power. Its long-term strategy is to achieve parity or superiority in key tech sectors (AI, quantum, chips) by 2049, which would further boost both its economic and military power. China’s rise has, in turn, prompted other nations to reinforce their own digital and cyber strategies, making it a central player in any discussion of cyber great power competition.
Russia
Russia presents a different profile: a country with relatively modest economic and digital-industrial base compared to the U.S. or China, but which leverages cyber and information operations as a force multiplier. Russia’s domestic digital economy is not especially large (aside from some regional players like Yandex or Kaspersky Lab), and many Russians use Western platforms (which the Kremlin also sees as a potential threat). However, what Russia lacks in Silicon Valley-style power, it makes up for in cyber-savvy human capital and a strategic doctrine that embraces asymmetric tools. The Russian government (and its security services like the FSB and military intelligence GRU) have a long history of high-impact cyber operations. These include the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia (one of the first instances of a country being hit with waves of DDoS attacks, knocking down banking and government sites during a political dispute) and the massive 2017 NotPetya malware attack (which, while aimed at Ukraine, spread globally and caused billions in damage to global companies). Russian actors are also blamed for penetrating the U.S. power grid (as a warning signal) and many other critical infrastructure intrusions worldwide – demonstrating an ability to hold at-risk the systems that societies depend on.
One of Russia’s signature tactics is combining hacking with information warfare. For instance, the cyber intrusion into the U.S. Democratic National Committee in 2016 yielded stolen emails that were later strategically leaked to damage a political campaign, and this technical hack was paired with a coordinated online disinformation effort by troll farms to influence voters. As cited earlier, Russia “exploits social media to spread disinformation,” making it a core part of its statecraft . These operations are relatively low-cost compared to Russia’s traditional military expenditures, yet have an outsized effect in undermining adversaries’ political cohesion and public trust. This reflects an understanding in Moscow that cyber power can compensate for economic weaknesses by keeping stronger rivals off balance. Russia’s military doctrine explicitly talks about “information confrontation” as a warfare domain. During its warfare in Ukraine, cyber attacks on media, telecom, and energy have accompanied kinetic strikes, illustrating an integrated approach.
On defense, Russia has been tightening control over its internet as well – testing the ability to isolate Runet (the Russian internet segment) from the global web, and passing laws to locate data servers inside Russia. This not only helps censorship but could be a resilience move to keep RuNet running if cut off globally. The Kremlin also heavily monitors domestic online activity and prosecutes those who dissent too loudly on digital platforms, blending cyber and traditional repression.
In summary, Russia is a prime example of using cyber power as an equalizer. Its global influence in the digital realm comes less from offering attractive technology or content, and more from skillful manipulation and attack. It has shown that a country with skilled cyber operators can inflict damage and influence geopolitics even if it lacks a large digital economy. However, these actions have also made Russia something of a pariah in cyberspace norms discussions, as Western countries frequently call out Russian cyberattacks as irresponsible behavior. Nonetheless, Russia will likely continue to refine its cyber toolkit – including potential use of ransomware gangs as proxies (many major ransomware groups operate from Russian territory, seemingly with tacit tolerance when they target the West). Thus, Russia remains a formidable cyber power noted for offense and influence operations, even as its overall digital power (in terms of economic/tech clout) is more limited.
Israel
Israel is often cited as a cyber powerhouse that punches far above its weight. With a population of under 10 million, Israel has leveraged a combination of government strategy, military talent development, and entrepreneurial culture to become a global center for cybersecurity innovation. Economically, Israel’s tech sector – especially information security – is a major growth engine; the country attracts large amounts of venture capital for cybersecurity startups and is home to leading companies in the field. This proliferation of cyber firms is no accident: many are founded by veterans of Israel’s elite military tech units, blurring the line between national security and private enterprise.
At the heart of Israel’s cyber strength is Unit 8200, a military signals intelligence and cyber unit often compared to the NSA in its function . Unit 8200 is the largest unit in the Israel Defense Forces and is responsible for signals interception, codebreaking, and offensive cyber operations . Its capabilities are highly secret, but it has been “allegedly involved in the 2005-10 Stuxnet virus attack that disabled Iranian nuclear centrifuges,” among other operations . This suggests Israel has world-class offensive cyber tools and has shown the willingness to use them in high-stakes national security scenarios. Israeli cyber teams have also reportedly carried out operations against adversaries like Hezbollah (as hinted by reports of hacking Hezbollah’s communications) and even helped thwart terrorism (a Unit 8200 operation foiled an ISIS plot by intercepting communications, as publicly acknowledged) .
Simultaneously, Israel is extremely advanced in cyber defense. Given the constant threat of cyber attacks from state and non-state actors surrounding it (Iranian hackers, Hezbollah, etc.), Israel has developed a robust multilayered defense strategy. There is close cooperation between government, military, and the private tech sector to secure critical infrastructure (water systems, energy, banking). National cyber drills and real-time information sharing are regularly conducted. Israel’s National Cyber Directorate oversees strategy and incident response across civilian sectors. The country also emphasizes education and talent pipeline: cybersecurity and computer science are promoted, and Unit 8200 famously selects youths with high aptitudes (sometimes straight out of high school) for intensive training . After military service, these skilled operators often form startups or join global tech firms, continually feeding Israel’s tech ecosystem . This cycle has given Israel a reputation as the “Startup Nation,” particularly strong in security tech.
Israel also extends its cyber diplomacy by exporting cybersecurity know-how and tools. Israeli firms sell security products worldwide, and Israel often assists allies with cyber defense expertise. However, this has sometimes courted controversy (for example, the case of Israeli companies exporting powerful spyware like Pegasus). It underscores that Israel is a leader in the cyber industrial base, not just operations. Strategically, Israel likely views its cyber power as a critical deterrent against larger foes – a way to asymmetrically hit back at enemies’ critical infrastructure if Israel itself is attacked, creating mutual vulnerability that discourages escalation.
In sum, Israel demonstrates how a small nation can become a significant digital/cyber power through focused investment in human capital and technology. By intertwining its military needs with economic innovation, Israel has secured both a stronger defense and a lucrative spot in the global digital economy. It stands as a case study in national cyber resilience and innovation.
Comparative Snapshot
To compare these national capabilities across key dimensions, the table below summarizes each country’s strengths in digital vs. cyber power:
| Country | Digital Power Highlights | Cyber Power Highlights |
| United States | – Home to major global tech platforms (Google, Amazon, Facebook) dominating search, cloud, and social media . – Largest digital economy with an innovation lead in AI, software, and semiconductor design. – Sets many global tech standards; leverages sanctions and export controls via control of payment and tech networks . | – Unrivaled offensive cyber capabilities (NSA & Cyber Command) and advanced cyber espionage programs . – Significant cybersecurity investments (~$17 billion in 2020) for defense of critical infrastructure . – Global cyber influence through alliances (e.g. NATO cyber commitments) and norms-setting efforts, while having conducted landmark operations like Stuxnet . |
| China | – Massive domestic digital market; tech giants (Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei) with global reach; leading 5G and e-commerce provider . – State-driven digital expansion (Digital Silk Road) exporting infrastructure and setting standards abroad. – Tight state control of data and internet (Great Firewall), enabling data harnessing for AI and economic planning, while insulating domestic tech from foreign competition. | – Large-scale cyber espionage targeting foreign governments and firms to acquire sensitive data and IP (e.g. PLA-linked hackers stealing trade secrets) . – Growing offensive military cyber unit (Strategic Support Force) capable of disrupting enemy networks; integration of cyber into military doctrine. – Emphasis on cyber sovereignty and robust defense of its own internet space, with extensive domestic surveillance and censorship as a form of cyber control. |
| Russia | – Limited consumer tech sector globally; no equivalents to Western or Chinese platform giants (aside from regional services like Yandex). – Strong state media and propaganda machinery amplified online to extend Russia’s cultural/political narratives abroad. – Focuses on geo-political use of digital influence rather than digital economy dominance (e.g. uses social networks for propaganda rather than exporting platforms) . | – Highly potent offensive cyber units (e.g. GRU hackers) known for bold attacks on infrastructure (power grids, government networks) and election interference campaigns. – Proficient in hybrid operations mixing cyber attacks with disinformation (e.g. hack-and-leak operations) to destabilize adversaries . – Adept at using proxies (criminal hackers, ransomware groups) to project power deniably; developing domestic internet controls for resilience and censorship. |
| Israel | – Thriving high-tech and startup ecosystem, especially in cybersecurity and surveillance tech; significant exporter of cyber products. – Culture of innovation fueled by close academia-industry-military ties; tech sector contributes heavily to economy. – Digital government services and infrastructure protected by cutting-edge security (Israel ranks high on cybersecurity preparedness indexes). | – Elite military cyber unit (Unit 8200) comparable to world’s best, involved in covert ops like the Iran Stuxnet attack . – Strong national cyber defense framework; continuously fends off state-sponsored attacks from regional adversaries. – Talent pipeline from Unit 8200 to civilian sector creates one of the world’s deepest pools of cybersecurity expertise , enhancing both defense and offense. |
(Sources: as cited in text above)
Conclusion
Digital power and cyber power have become core pillars of national power in the 21st century, alongside traditional military and economic might. They are deeply interrelated – mastery of digital technology fuels cyber capabilities, and effective cyber operations can safeguard or expand a nation’s digital advantages. Geopolitically, states use digital and cyber tools to influence, deter, and compel each other, whether through economic dependencies created by technology or through direct cyber attacks and information warfare. Militarily, cyber power is now part of the arsenal, while economically, digital prowess drives growth and can tilt global trade in one’s favor. Societies, too, are adjusting to a reality where security and prosperity depend on bits and bytes as much as on bullets and factories.
However, these powers come with challenges. The same interconnectedness that grants influence also creates vulnerabilities – a fact underlined by rising cyber threats and the difficulty of securing complex digital systems. There is also a contest of values: will the digital domain be open and free, or segmented and controlled? Nations strong in digital and cyber power are not only competing for strategic advantage but also shaping the future character of the international system.
In reviewing definitions: digital power is the broad ability to shape outcomes through digital means (from economics to culture), and cyber power is a critical subset focusing on the capabilities and actions in cyberspace. Both are now indispensable in any comprehensive assessment of a country’s power. The examples of the U.S., China, Russia, and Israel show different pathways to achieving such power – via innovation and global business, via state-driven mobilization of resources, via asymmetric exploitation of others’ openness, or via talent and niche specialization. Other nations (from European powers to emerging tech players like India or regional cyber actors like Iran and North Korea) further demonstrate that this is a diverse, global playing field.
In conclusion, understanding international relations and national security today requires understanding digital and cyber power. Those nations that effectively integrate these capabilities with their overall strategy – balancing hard and soft power, offense and defense, innovation and regulation – will hold the advantage. And for the world as a whole, cooperation in areas like cybersecurity and digital governance will be essential to harness the benefits of the digital revolution while mitigating its risks. The age of digital and cyber power is here to stay, reshaping how power is acquired, exercised, and contested on the global stage.
Sources:
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- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Reconceptualizing Cyber Power.” Harvard Kennedy School, 2020 .
- European Council on Foreign Relations. “Europe’s Digital Power: From Geo-economics to Cybersecurity.” 2017 .
- Naz, F. & Mirza, F. “Digital Hegemony in the Contemporary Era.” IJSS Bulletin, 2025 .
- Gao, Xinchuchu. “China’s Ambition to Shape Cyber Norms.” LSE Blogs, 2022 .
- Reuters. “What is Israel’s secretive cyber warfare unit 8200?” Sept 18, 2024 .