Different philosophical traditions have developed distinctive ways of assigning importance or value – essentially “dictating the weights” of things. Below is a structured summary, organized by major traditions and thinkers, outlining how each approaches the determination of value. Each section includes notable quotes or writings in which philosophers describe how value is established.

Utilitarianism: Value as Aggregate Happiness

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory (pioneered by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill) that assigns value based on consequences for overall well-being. In this view, something is important to the extent it increases pleasure or reduces pain for the greatest number of people:

  • Greatest Happiness Principle: Actions are judged by their utility in producing happiness (pleasure) versus unhappiness (pain). As Mill famously states, “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” . Here happiness is defined as pleasure and the absence of pain, which are the intrinsic goods in this system.
  • Impartial Calculation: Utilitarianism treats each individual’s welfare equally, essentially weighing each person’s happiness as one unit. The moral importance of any action is calculated by summing its effects on everyone’s well-being . Bentham even proposed a “hedonic calculus” to quantify pleasures and pains, reflecting the idea that value can be measured and compared like weights on a scale.
  • Ends Over Means: Because only outcomes (not intentions or inherent qualities of acts) carry moral weight here, anything – truth, beauty, even justice – can be valuable if it leads to happiness, or outweighed if it prevents a greater harm. This focus on ends led Mill to argue that some pleasures are qualitatively higher than others (e.g. intellectual pleasures over mere sensual ones), refining how utilitarians “weight” different kinds of value.

Utilitarianism’s approach highlights a quantitative assignment of value: all sources of value (rights, virtues, etc.) are secondary to the single intrinsic value of happiness. This offers a clear if sometimes controversial way to dictate importance, famously summarized by Bentham’s dictum that “each [person] to count for one, nobody for more than one.”

Kantian Deontology: Duty and Intrinsic Dignity

In contrast, Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics assigns value based on principled duty and the intrinsic worth of persons, rather than outcomes. For Kant, the moral law (as given by reason’s Categorical Imperative) determines what has value unconditionally:

  • The Good Will: Kant argues that only a good will – the commitment to act from duty for its own sake – is inherently good, regardless of consequences. “Nothing can possibly be conceived… which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will,” Kant writes . Qualities like intelligence or courage, and even happiness, have value only if guided by a good will. In other words, the intention behind an action carries absolute moral weight, more so than any calculable outcome.
  • Duty and Universal Law: An action has moral worth if done from duty in obedience to the moral law (e.g. “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”). This framework “weighs” the rightness of acts by their adherence to universalizable principles, not by balancing consequences. Lying, for example, is deemed wrong in itself – no matter how useful a lie might be – because truth-telling is a categorical duty.
  • Dignity vs. Price: Kant draws a famous distinction between things that have a price (a conditional, relative value) and those that have dignity (an intrinsic, incomparable value). “In the kingdom of ends, everything has either a price or a dignity. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price… has a dignity,” Kant explains . Human beings, as rational agents, possess dignity – they are ends in themselves, never to be treated merely as means. This elevates certain values (like respect for persons, freedom, human rights) beyond any trade-off or calculation. No amount of benefit, for instance, can “outweigh” an individual’s basic rights without moral violation.

Deontology thus introduces a qualitative hierarchy of value: some values (grounded in duty and respect for persons) are absolute and non-negotiable. The “weights” are dictated by moral principles and inherent dignity rather than by summing effects. Kant’s approach has shaped modern ideas of human rights and the sense that some things (like honesty or human life) must be valued categorically, not instrumentally.

Aristotle and Virtue Ethics: Purpose and the Highest Good

Aristotle’s approach to value in his virtue ethics is teleological – it bases importance on the purpose or end (telos) of beings and actions. Aristotle sees all human activities as aiming at some good, and he identifies a hierarchy of ends culminating in one supreme good:

  • Hierarchy of Ends: We pursue many things (wealth, honor, pleasure, knowledge), but they are not all ultimate. Some are means to higher ends – for example, we seek wealth to secure comfort, or take medicine to gain health. Aristotle observes that “we choose some of these [ends] for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends” . The chain of value must terminate in a highest end that is desirable for its own sake. Otherwise, if every end were for the sake of another, “our desire would be empty and vain” .
  • Eudaimonia as Intrinsic Value: Aristotle argues the final end – the chief good – is eudaimonia (often translated as happiness or flourishing). “We call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else”, he explains, and “now such a thing [is] happiness, above all else” . Eudaimonia is the ultimate intrinsic value: we seek it for itself, and other goods (riches, honors, virtues, etc.) are valued insofar as they promote or constitute it. This concept of an intrinsic vs. instrumental value is central – eudaimonia has worth in itself, whereas instrumental goods have worth derived from their contribution to the final good.
  • Virtue and the Proper Function: Aristotle determines what is truly valuable by considering human nature and our distinctive function (reasoning well). A life of virtuous activity in accordance with reason is what fulfills our nature and leads to eudaimonia. Thus, virtues (like courage, wisdom, justice) are assigned great importance as character traits that enable one to realize the highest good. Value, for Aristotle, is tightly linked to fulfilling one’s purpose: “human good turns out to be an activity of soul in accordance with virtue” in a complete life .

In virtue ethics, then, value is contextual and intrinsic: it depends on the nature of the thing in question and its role in achieving a flourishing life. Rather than an abstract calculus or absolute rule, Aristotle “weighs” things by how much they contribute to the ultimate purpose (telos) of human life. This yields a more organic ranking of values – for example, moral and intellectual virtues are prized as the highest excellences, while money is seen as lower (purely instrumental) value, “merely useful and for the sake of something else” .

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value (Value in Itself vs. as Means)

Philosophers across metaphysics and ethics have distinguished intrinsic value (value in itself) from extrinsic or instrumental value (value as a means to an end). This distinction underlies many debates on what truly “matters”:

  • Intrinsic Value: An intrinsic good is something valued for its own sake, independent of its utility. Aristotle’s highest good (happiness/flourishing) is one example – it is worthy of desire in and of itself . Similarly, 20th-century philosopher G. E. Moore argued that qualities like goodness or beauty are “intrinsic kinds of value,” not merely subjective preferences . For Moore, to call something intrinsically good means that its goodness depends on its own nature and not on external factors or consequences. Many ethical theories posit at least one intrinsic value (e.g. pleasure for utilitarians, a good will for Kant, virtue for Aristotle) as the foundation of their system of importance.
  • Extrinsic (Instrumental) Value: An instrumental value is something considered valuable because it leads to or causes something else that is valued. It is a means to an end. For instance, money has extrinsic value – not important by itself, but useful for obtaining other things we desire. Aristotle noted “wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else” . Likewise, education might be instrumentally valued for the knowledge or opportunities it provides. Extrinsic value can be considerable (since means can be vital to achieve ends), but it is derivative: the weight we assign it comes from whatever intrinsic value it helps realize.

This concept plays a key role in metaphysical discussions about what really has value. Intrinsic vs. extrinsic also maps onto debates like objective vs. subjective value (if something is intrinsically good, it might be seen as good regardless of anyone’s attitudes). Some philosophers (e.g. Moore, or environmental ethicists who argue nature has intrinsic value) maintain that certain things just are valuable in themselves, while others argue that all value ultimately stems from how things relate to desires or purposes (and is thus extrinsic or assigned). The balance between these perspectives informs whether we think value is something discovered (inherent in the world) or conferred (based on our goals or feelings).

Aesthetic Value: Beauty and Taste

In aesthetics, the question of how we assign value to beauty (and art) has been approached by examining human taste – which can be highly subjective – versus the search for some objective or universal standards. Philosophers like David Hume and Immanuel Kant provide two influential perspectives:

  • Hume: “Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder”: In his essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” David Hume emphasizes the variability of aesthetic judgment. He notes that people often disagree about what is beautiful, and crucially, that beauty is not a property of objects but a reaction in observers. “Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty,” writes Hume . According to Hume, our sentiments of taste are akin to preferences in flavor – there is no fact of the matter about beauty independent of observers (hence the proverb “there’s no disputing about taste”). However, Hume doesn’t conclude all opinions are equal; he suggests that education and practice can refine one’s taste, and that the consensus of true judges (experienced critics) might serve as a tentative standard of taste. Still, the core idea is that aesthetic value is dictated by sentiment, making it personal and context-bound. What we deem valuable in art or nature depends on our faculties and “mental impressions,” not on objective metrics.
  • Kant: Universal yet Subjective Beauty: Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Judgment, agrees that beauty isn’t an objective property like shape or size, but he explores why we speak as if aesthetic judgments have universal validity. Kant famously describes the beautiful as “that which pleases universally, without a concept.” In other words, a judgment of taste is based on a feeling of pleasure, not on a logical rule, yet we intuitively expect others ought to agree with it . For example, if I call a painting beautiful, I don’t mean “beautiful for me” – I propose it as beautiful period, inviting others to see it too. Kant explains this by saying that the experience of beauty involves a free play of imagination and understanding common to all human minds, yielding a “subjective universality” of taste . We assign value to beauty in a special way: it is disinterested pleasure (we appreciate it without utilitarian or moral considerations) and we feel it has a claim on universal assent (even though no definitive proof can be given). Thus, Kant bridges subjective feeling and a kind of universality in aesthetic value. Beauty, for him, has a unique normative weight – it is valued as if universal, which is why debates about art and taste, unlike mere preferences, invoke reasons and principles (however subtle) and not just personal whim.

In summary, aesthetic philosophers grapple with whether beauty’s value is determined entirely by individual taste or if there is some common human faculty that sets a standard. Hume leans toward the relative and sentimental nature of beauty, tempered by the idea of learned discernment, while Kant provides a framework where beauty has no formula yet still commands a form of universal value in our shared human sensibility. Later thinkers (such as Leo Tolstoy or Clive Bell, and more recently feminist and postmodern critiques of art) have further debated whether artistic value is inherent or constructed, but the tension between subjective and (inter)subjective valuation remains central in aesthetics.

Existentialism: Value and Meaning as Individual Choice

Existentialist philosophers, reacting to a modern sense of dislocation and the “death of absolutes,” approach value as something that individuals must create in an inherently meaningless or indifferent universe. Thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus insist that importance is not dictated by any external source (God, nature, or tradition) but by our own free choices and commitments:

  • Existence Precedes Essence: Sartre’s slogan captures the idea that humans are not born with a built-in purpose or value; we simply exist, and only later define ourselves (our “essence”) through action. This entails that nothing is given as fundamentally valuable – we must decide what values to adopt. “If existence really does precede essence,” Sartre writes, “there is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human nature… man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself” . This radical freedom means each person dictates the weights of things by their choices. We “invent values,” in Sartre’s phrase, since in a godless universe no prior values exist to guide us . For example, whether one values honesty over success, or loyalty over freedom, is ultimately one’s own responsibility – there is no universal hierarchy handed down to legitimize those priorities.
  • Freedom, Anguish, and Responsibility: With the power to create values comes existential anguish – the recognition that, in choosing for ourselves, we also implicitly legislate values for humanity. Sartre gives the example of a youth choosing between staying with his mother or joining the resistance; no moral law can tell him which is the right value (filial duty or patriotic duty), he must choose, and in doing so affirm the importance of that path. “To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen… What we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all,” Sartre says . This is not a utilitarian claim but a point about value-creation: by deciding, we endorse a certain value as the good (as if for everyone), yet without any external justification. This heavy burden – realizing that “we are left alone, without excuse” – is what Sartre calls being condemned to be free .
  • Meaning and Rebellion: Other existentialists like Camus focus on the value of life as a whole in the face of the absurd (the conflict between our desire for meaning and the silent, indifferent world). Camus famously said the fundamental question is whether life is worth living. His answer is that we must rebel against absurdity by embracing life’s projects and passions, thereby creating value. In The Myth of Sisyphus, he portrays Sisyphus – condemned to a meaningless task – as finding meaning in his very defiance: “One must imagine Sisyphus happy,” Camus concludes, implying that Sisyphus assigns value to his existence through attitude and perseverance. This encapsulates the existential idea that value is not found but made: through love, art, solidarity, or personal resolve, we imbue our lives with importance despite the absence of any objective measure.

In existentialism, therefore, values are subjective but urgent – they arise from personal freedom and commitment. There is a shift from asking “What is the Good?” to asking “What shall I value, and why?” with the knowledge that no answer is given by default. This modern ethos places the weight of creating meaning on the individual’s shoulders. As Sartre succinctly puts it, “there is no sense in life a priori… the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose” . In other words, importance is not an inherent property of things, but a project – the project of living authentically by the values one freely adopts.

Nietzsche: Revaluation of All Values

Friedrich Nietzsche offers a provocative approach to value, critiquing traditional morals and asserting that value is created by human perspectives – especially by the bold and strong-willed. Nietzsche saw prevailing Judeo-Christian moral values as life-denying and called for a “revaluation of all values.” Key aspects of his view include:

  • Master vs. Slave Morality: Nietzsche analyzes the history of values in terms of power dynamics. In Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morality, he claims that what we consider “good” or “evil” originated in the value-judgments of different groups. The noble or master class valued strength, pride, and excellence – “the noble type of man regards himself as a determiner of values… he is a creator of values” . By contrast, the weaker or slave class (historically the oppressed) valued humility, sympathy, and equality – traits that served their interest and resentment toward the powerful . Nietzsche thus demystifies morals: they are not divine decrees, but human-made valuations rooted in forms of life. What one culture calls “virtue” another might call “vice,” depending on whose perspective is dominant.
  • Value Creation and the Übermensch: Since Nietzsche denies any absolute, objective good, he instead celebrates the idea of value creation as an expression of vitality. The most life-affirming individuals – whom he labels Übermenschen (overmen) – boldly create new values rather than follow herd morality. “The noble man… knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things,” Nietzsche writes; “he despises” the timid outlook that bases values on utility or the approval of others . This philosophy thus assigns ultimate importance to strength of spirit: the creative will that can posit its own goals and standards. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche gives the image of a “lion” who must destroy old values (the dragon of “Thou Shalt”) to become a free creator, and a “child” who innocently affirms a new game of value. The process is one of emancipation: “to philosophize is to reverse values,” he asserts, meaning each free spirit must transvalue inherited norms and decide anew what is good or evil.
  • “God is Dead” – No External Source of Value: Nietzsche’s famous pronouncement that “God is dead” is directly tied to the crisis of values. Without a divine guarantor or universally accepted truth, the old basis for values crumbles. This could lead to nihilism (the belief that nothing has value), but Nietzsche urges a response of creative freedom: we must become “gods” in the sense of being the source of value and meaning. There is a tone of existentialism here – Nietzsche is a forerunner to Sartre – but Nietzsche places more emphasis on cultural and psychological factors in value creation (e.g. the role of art, myth, and aristocratic vs. resentful mindsets). For him, life itself (especially in its most vigorous, expansive form) is the standard of value. Whatever enhances the will to power – the feeling of vitality, creativity, growth – is deemed good, and whatever springs from weakness or negation of life is suspect. He challenges us to ask: are our current values (altruism, humility, rational truth) expressions of strength or remnants of slave morality? And he answers by envisioning new values that would affirm life more honestly and joyously.

In Nietzsche’s framework, then, the act of valuation is an expression of will. Importance is not an intrinsic property measured on an impartial scale, but something stamped onto the world by human drives. He invites us to consider who is doing the weighting: strong individuals and cultures will create values that reflect their vitality, whereas adopting values uncritically is a sign of herd mentality. Nietzsche’s colorful declarations (e.g. “There are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena”) capture this: reality in itself is value-neutral; value enters when a perspective says “this is good/bad for us.” Hence all weight given to things is, in the end, a human, all-too-human affair – and Nietzsche’s hope is that we take up that task consciously and artfully, rather than remain bound by decaying dogmas.

Postmodern Perspectives: Relativism and Social Construction of Value

Building on some Nietzschean insights, postmodern thought (late 20th-century philosophy and cultural theory) is characterized by skepticism toward any fixed or universal system of values. Postmodern philosophers question grand narratives and objective truths, suggesting that what we consider valuable or true is largely a product of social, historical, or linguistic contexts:

  • Incredulity Toward Metanarratives: Philosopher Jean-François Lyotard famously defined the postmodern condition as “incredulity toward metanarratives” . By metanarratives, he means the big stories or frameworks (like Enlightenment progress, religious salvation history, or Marxist revolution) that used to legitimize values and truth claims. Postmodernists no longer believe in a single overarching story that grounds all values. This implies that there is no single scale of importance accepted by everyone; instead, there are many “language games” and local narratives. Values are fragmentary and contingent – within one discourse or community something may be paramount, while another community holds an incompatible value structure. The weight we assign (to moral norms, aesthetic standards, political ideals) thus becomes a pluralistic affair, without an ultimate umpire.
  • Subjectivism, Relativism, Plurality: In general, postmodern thinkers emphasize subjectivity and relativism about values. As one summary puts it, “Postmodernism is characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, and relativism. It constitutes a general suspicion of… any established narrative or truth claim.” . Instead of believing values are grounded in nature or reason (as earlier philosophers did), postmodernists see them as social constructs – created by particular cultures or interest groups. For example, Michel Foucault analyzes how what a society takes as “truth” or “morality” is enforced by power structures and institutions, rather than reflecting eternal standards. “Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint… Each society has its regime of truth… the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false,” Foucault observes . By extension, what counts as valuable or normal (say, sexual norms, or the value of work, or notions of sanity) varies across time and is maintained by regimes of power/knowledge. Postmodern analysis often involves deconstructing how a value (e.g. the concept of “high art” or the virtue of “objectivity”) is not natural or universal but contingent on certain narratives and exclusions.
  • Freedom and Play of Values: Some strands of postmodern thought do not stop at relativism, but encourage a kind of playfulness or innovation in value creation. If all values are up for question, individuals and communities can experiment with new forms of life. For instance, Richard Rorty (a pragmatist often associated with postmodernism) suggests we simply choose values that suit the kind of society we want, without worrying about them being “objectively true.” Similarly, postmodern art often intentionally subverts traditional aesthetic values to show they are not sacred. However, this freedom is double-edged: critics argue it can lead to moral nihilism or cynicism (hence the charge that “if truth is relative, nothing is wrong”). Postmodern thinkers respond that local solidarities and “small narratives” can still guide action – we just shouldn’t impose them universally. The emphasis is on diversity of perspectives and an ethics of tolerance for different value systems, since no neutral standpoint exists to declare one the best.

In summary, postmodernism shifts focus from what is valued to who decides and how values are justified. It reveals that the weights we assign are tied to context – whether it’s cultural narratives, language, or power relations. Values do not float free of human discourse: they are situated. The postmodern stance is a reminder that every claim of importance (be it ethical, scientific, or aesthetic) comes from within a tradition or worldview, not from an Archimedean point. This has led to more self-awareness in philosophy about Eurocentric or patriarchal biases in past value systems, and opened the door for multiple modernities – for example, feminist, post-colonial, and queer theories each reevaluating values from their own standpoint. The result is a landscape where assigning importance is less about finding the one true scale of value and more about negotiating meaning in a pluralistic world.

Conclusion: Across these traditions – from utilitarian cost-benefit calculations, to Kantian moral absolutes, Aristotelian purpose-driven goods, subjective tastes in beauty, existential self-determination, Nietzschean transvaluation, and postmodern skepticism – philosophy offers a rich panorama of how value can be conceived and weighed. Each approach provides insight into what it means to say something “matters” or is “good.” Whether value is seen as a measurable quantity, an inviolable principle, an innate goal, a personal choice, or a social construct, the conversation among these thinkers deepens our understanding of how we assign importance in our lives and societies. As these perspectives suggest, to dictate the weights of things is ultimately to ask what we as human beings ought to cherish, pursue, or uphold – a question that lies at the heart of philosophical inquiry into value.

Sources:

  • Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism – on actions being right if they promote happiness .
  • Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals – on the good will as the only unconditional good and the distinction between price and dignity .
  • Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics – on the final end (happiness) being desired for itself, never as a means .
  • Hume, David. “Of the Standard of Taste” – on beauty as existing in the mind, not in objects .
  • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment – on beauty as that which pleases universally without concept (universal subjective validity of taste) .
  • Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism is a Humanism – on our forlorn freedom to invent values and the idea that “the value of [life] is nothing else but the sense that you choose” .
  • Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil – on the noble person as “a determiner of values” who “is a creator of values” .
  • Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition – defining postmodernism as skepticism toward universal narratives .
  • Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge (and interviews) – on truth and values being tied to societal “regimes” and power relations . (Foucault’s view exemplifies the postmodern understanding that what counts as true or important is contingent on context and power).